

THE PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
OF SAINT GREGORY OF NYSSA

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Except for the notes, this article is substantially identical with a paper read at the "Symposium on the Cappadocian Fathers" held at the Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection in May 1956.

THE anthropology of the Cappadocian Fathers culminates in St. Gregory of Nyssa's teaching on the nature and destinies of man, which is founded on two great traditions: the biblical doctrine of man's creation and reformation after the image and likeness of God, and the Greek philosophical conception of *paideia* and *askesis* as means toward the assimilation of man to God. Gregory of Nyssa is the only one among the Cappadocian Fathers who wrote a systematic anthropological treatise: his book, *Περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου*, *De hominis opificio*, *On the Making of Man*.¹ The depth and eloquence of this work make the Bishop of Nyssa the natural center of any account of Cappadocian anthropology.

In *De hominis opificio* ancient philosophical elements are more prominent than in Gregory of Nyssa's other writings. Even here they are subordinate to the biblical image doctrine; but in some of his more explicitly mystical treatises the Bishop of Nyssa reaches a still higher spiritual level, hardly ever surpassed by later Christian mystics, whose indebtedness to him has been fully recognized only in recent years.² The scope of this

¹ Migne, *Patrologia Graeca* (hereafter PG) XLIV, 124D ff. See also Grégoire de Nysse, *La création de l'homme*, introduction and translation by J. Laplace, S.J., notes by J. Daniélou, S.J., (Sources chrétiennes, Paris, 1943, hereafter Gr. Nyss., *Création* Laplace-Daniélou). Gregory of Nyssa wrote *De hominis opificio* in 379.

² The last fifteen years have seen an amazing outburst of productive scholarship around Gregory of Nyssa and the two other great Cappadocians. For Gregory of Nyssa see above all J. Daniélou, S.J., *Platonisme et théologie mystique: Doctrine spirituelle de Grégoire de Nysse*, 2nd ed. (*Théologie* II, Paris, 1953, hereafter Daniélou, *Platonisme*), H. Merki, O.S.B., 'ΟΜΟΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕΩΙ: *Von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa* (*Paradosis* VII, Freiburg in der Schweiz, 1952, hereafter Merki, 'ΟΜΟΙΩΣΙΣ), and W. Jaeger, *Two Rediscovered Works of Ancient Christian Literature: Gregory of Nyssa and Macarius* (Leiden, 1954, hereafter Jaeger, *Rediscovered Works*); also H. U. v. Balthasar, S.J., *Présence et pensée: Essai sur la philosophie religieuse de Grégoire de Nysse* (Paris, 1942); E. v. Ivanka, "Vom Platonismus zur Theorie der Mystik (Zur Erkenntnislehre Gregors von Nyssa)," *Scholastik* XI (1936), 163 ff.; *idem*, *Hellenisches und Christliches im frühbyzantinischen Geistesleben* (Vienna, 1948), 28 ff.; J. T. Muckle, C.S.B., "The Doctrine of St. Gregory of Nyssa on Man as the Image of God," *Mediaeval Studies* VII (1945), 55 ff.; R. Leys, S.J., *L'image de Dieu chez Saint Grégoire de Nysse* (Museum Lessianum, Section théologique, XLIX, Brussels, Paris, 1951, hereafter Leys, *Image*), *idem*, "La théologie spirituelle de Grégoire de Nysse," *Studia Patristica* II (Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der althristlichen Literatur LXIV [Berlin, 1957]), 495 ff.; J. Gaïth, *La conception de la liberté chez Grégoire de Nysse* (*Études de philosophie médiévale* XLIII, Paris, 1953); W. Völker, *Gregor von Nyssa als Mystiker* (Wiesbaden, 1955, hereafter Völker, *Gregor*). For Gregory of Nazianzus see J. Plagnieux, *Saint Grégoire de Nazianze théologien* (Paris, 1952); for Basil see D. Amand (de Mendieta), *L'ascèse monastique de Saint Basile* (Maredsous, 1948). For all three Cappadocians cf. E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1954), 52 ff., and bibliographies on pp. 580 ff. — Being neither a philologist nor a philosopher and theologian, but a mediaeval historian, who was led into patristics in

paper does not permit me to go far beyond that more philosophical anthropology³ which appears particularly in *De hominis opificio*, to some extent also in Gregory of Nyssa's other works such as *De anima et resurrectione*⁴ and *Oratio catechetica*,⁵ and similarly, though less clearly, in the writings of the other great Cappadocians, St. Basil and St. Gregory of Nazianzus. To all of them, of course, and to Gregory of Nyssa especially, philosophical and mystical anthropology really form one whole: philosophy to them is only a way of approach toward union with God, though an indispensable and an exalted way.

In trying to penetrate to the vital core of Gregory of Nyssa's anthropology, one is necessarily led to a question which in various forms underlies much of the saint's philosophical speculations: why, if man was created according to the image and likeness of God and at the same time was made a spiritual-corporeal compound, should his God-given bodily condition be an occasion for so much suffering and evil? The relationship of the material body to the immortal spirit and the position of the soul and mind between the two were among the principal problems of Gregory of Nyssa's philosophical anthropology, if not the principal ones.⁶

Gregory was conscious of the excellence and dignity not only of the human mind, but also of the human body, for he saw both as creatures of God.⁷ He had as a twofold spiritual inheritance the Pauline conception of human bodies as temples of God and members of Christ, and the millennial Greek effort to achieve *kalokagathia*, to attain the right balance between physical and mental perfection. Yet to explain the *πάθη* of the body, which are both passions and sufferings, he could no longer be content merely with

pursuit of the origins of certain mediaeval ideas, I wish to emphasize my great debt to the works mentioned and to the other studies quoted in this paper.

³ Certain aspects of Gregory's mystical anthropology, contained, for instance, in *De vita Mosis* and in the homilies *In Cantica canticorum* and *De beatitudinibus*, were explained by Professor Werner Jaeger in his two lectures at the 1956 Dumbarton Oaks Symposium. For the rest, see the literature quoted in the preceding note.

⁴ PG XLVI, 12A ff.

⁵ Ed. J. H. Srawley, *The Catechetical Oration of Gregory of Nyssa* (Cambridge Patristic Texts, Cambridge, 1903); also PG XLV, 9A ff.

⁶ This was recognized by H. Cherniss in a study — *The Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa* (University of California Publications in Classical Philology XI, 1, Berkeley, 1930, hereafter Cherniss, *Platonism*) — which is of great significance not only where it makes positive contributions to the understanding of the anthropology of the Bishop of Nyssa, but also where Cherniss' criticism of Gregory's thought and character invites counter-criticism. I hope to show toward the end of this paper that the Gregorian doctrines which Professor Cherniss criticizes are indeed crucial, but crucial in the sense that without them Gregory's anthropology would be incomplete.

⁷ See, for instance, *In Cantica canticorum, homil. VII* (to Canticle 4:2), PG XLIV, 928B: Τὸ δὲ διπλοῦν κύημα αἰνίγμα τῆς καθ' ἑκάτερον γίνεται τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν νενοσημένων εὐδοκίμησης . . .

St. Paul's "but the body is for the Lord";⁸ nor was it sufficient for him simply to recur to Plato's heroic inversion of Greek love of physical beauty and excellence, in the sense that the good is also the beautiful.⁹ For, in the meantime, Origen, the Greek and Christian teacher from whose great shadow the Cappadocians, and Gregory of Nyssa in particular, could never quite separate themselves, had all-too-radically transcended St. Paul's ethical and Plato's dialectic attitude toward the body. Like other late Platonists, Origen had cut through the delicate weave of man's composite nature; if he did not as a Christian, to whom the Incarnation of the Son of God was essential, consider the body the source of evil, he nevertheless assumed that corporeal life was only a punitive, pedagogical, and redemptive consequence of creatures' lapse from pure spirituality.¹⁰ It will be seen later that Gregory of Nyssa in this respect did not pursue Origen's way of thinking to its logical end. A higher logic, that of the excellence of all of God's creation, forbade his eliminating altogether the corporeal mode of existence from the beginnings of the world and of man.

As to the relationship of Gregory's anthropology to that of the Greek Fathers in general, it is important to note that he did not distinguish, as most of them had done and were to do, between the terms and concepts *εἰκὼν* (image) and *ὁμοίωσις* (likeness) in the account of man's creation by God according to Genesis 1:26: "Let us make man to our image and likeness." Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Basil had conceived of *homoiosis* as the perfection of the original image relation; in creation this God-likeness existed only in a germinal state.¹¹ For Gregory *homoiosis* is

τῇ μὲν ψυχῇ τὴν ἀπάθειαν, τῷ δὲ σωματικῷ βίω τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην γεννῶντας . . . See also Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oratio* XLI, 5, in *Pentecosten*, PG XXXVI, 436B: nobody has so far convinced Gregory ὅτι κάλλιον ἀπεσκενᾶσθαι τοῦ σώματος.

⁸ 1 Corinthians 6:13.

⁹ See, for instance, *Symposium* 201C.

¹⁰ See, for instance, Origen, *In Joannem* XX, 22 (20), 182, *Griechische Christliche Schriftsteller* (hereafter GCS), *Orig.* IV, 355: καὶ ἡμῶν δὲ ἡ προηγουμένη ὑπόστασις ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος· ἡ δὲ ἐξ αἰτίας ἐν τῷ ληθέντι ἀπὸ τοῦ χοῦ τῆς γῆς πλάσματι.

¹¹ This distinction of the biblical *εἰκὼν* and *ὁμοίωσις* is probably of Gnostic (Valentinian) origin; cf. A. Struher, *Die Gottesebenbildlichkeit des Menschen in der christlichen Literatur der ersten zwei Jahrhunderte* (Münster, 1913), 55 ff. For Irenaeus see, for instance, *Adversus haereses* V, 6, 1, ed. W. W. Harvey, *Sancti Irenaei . . . Adversus Haereses* II (Cambridge, 1857), 334, cf. Struher, *op. cit.*, 87 ff., Merki, 'ΟΜΟΙΩΣΙΣ 45 and 84; for Clement, for instance, *Stromata* II, 22 (131,6), GCS, *Clem. Al.* II, 185, cf. Merki, *op. cit.*, 83 ff., A. Mayer, *Das Gottesbild im Menschen nach Clemens von Alexandrien* (Studia Anselmiana VIII, Rome, 1942); for Origen, for instance, *De principiis* III, 6, 1, GCS, *Orig.* V, 280 f., cf. H. Crouzel, S.J., *Théologie de l'image de Dieu chez Origène* (*Théologie* XXXIV, Paris, 1956), 217 ff.; for Basil, for instance, *Homil. in Ps.* XLVIII, 8, PG XXIX, 449D, and *De Spiritu Sancto* I, 2, PG XXXII, 69B, cf. S. Giet, "Saint Basile a-t-il donné une suite aux homélies de l'hexaméron?", *Recherches de science religieuse* XXXIII (1946), 248 ff.

fully existent already in the creational *eikon*, though it must be regained after man's loss of it through original sin. Gregory could therefore, use the words "image" and "likeness" interchangeably, and use the static terms *ὁμοίωμα* (that which is alike) or *ὁμοιότης* (being alike) beside the more dynamic term *ὁμοίωσις* (which means both becoming alike and likeness). Clearly, he considers man's creational resemblance to God as the foundation by divine grace of all human and divinely assisted efforts to become similar to Him again.

Dom Hubert Merki in his study 'ΟΜΟΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕΩΙ has firmly established the equivalence of the Gregorian terms *eikon* and *homoiosis*, both in the creation and in the reformation of man. Gregory is the first of the Fathers to attribute to man full *ὁμοίωσις Θεῷ* not only at the end, but at the beginning of his history.¹²

For the rest, similarity, even more than the image, is the dominant relation which links man to God in all Greek patristic thought with the obvious exception of Athanasius.¹³ This emphasis on *homoiosis* — similarity, re-

¹² See, for instance, *De virginitate*, ed. J. P. Cavaros, *Gregorii Nysseni Opera*, ed. W. Jaeger, VIII, 1 (Leiden, 1952), 300: Οὐ γὰρ ἡμέτερον ἔργον οὐδὲ δυνάμει ἀνθρωπίνης ἐστὶ κατόρθωμα ἢ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὁμοίωσις, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ μεγαλοδωρεάς ἐστιν, εὐθὺς ἅμα τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσει χαρισμένον τῇ φύσει τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοιότητα. Here the creational image-likeness (*ὁμοιότης*) is clearly the basis for all later assimilation (*ὁμοίωσις*) and both are gifts of God's grace. For the use of *ὁμοιότης* and *ὁμοίωμα* beside *ὁμοίωσις* in Gregory of Nyssa see also the texts *De hominis opificio* 5, PG XLIV, 137A, *De professione christiana*, ed. W. Jaeger, *Greg. Nyss. Opera* VIII, 1, 136, and *De beatitudinibus, oratio* VI, PG XLIV, 1272B. Dom Hubert Merki, 'ΟΜΟΙΩΣΙΣ 165, Appendix "a" convincingly refutes recent attempts (by E. v. Ivanka, "Die Autorschaft der Homilien Εἰς τὸ Ποιήσωμεν . . .," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* XXXVI [1936], 46 ff., and by Leys, *Image*, 130 ff.) to save the Gregorian authenticity of the two homilies Εἰς τὸ Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμέτεραν καὶ ὁμοίωσιν, *In verba: Faciamus hominem secundum imaginem et similitudinem nostram* (PG XLIV, 257 ff.), which clearly make the same sharp distinction between *εἰκὼν* and *ὁμοίωσις* which is found in Irenaeus, Clement, and Origen (see *supra* p. 63). Merki, however, was not aware of the fact that the two homilies which go under the name of St. Basil and under the title *De structura hominis* (PG XXX, 9 ff.) constitute a longer and modified version of those entitled *In verba: Faciamus . . .* and attributed to Gregory of Nyssa; cf. the article of Giet, quoted in the preceding note, 317 ff., D. Amand (de Mendieta), "Les états de texte des homélies pseudo-basiliennes sur la création de l'homme," *Revue Bénédictine* LIX (1949), 3 ff., J. Daniélou, S.J., "La chronologie des sermons de Grégoire de Nysse," *Revue des sciences religieuses* XXIX (1955), 346 ff., W. Jaeger, review of Merki, 'ΟΜΟΙΩΣΙΣ in *Gnomon* XXVII (1955), 580; Giet and P. Daniélou believe that the shorter recension of the homilies (i.e., *In verba: Faciamus . . .*) is based on notes taken after homilies given by Basil. — In general, see, for instance, R. McL. Wilson, "The Early History of the Exegesis of Gen. 1:26," *Studia Patristica* I (1957), 420 ff.; also W. Hess, O.S.B., "Imago Dei (Gen. 1:26)," *Benediktinische Monatschrift* XXIX (1953), 371 ff.

¹³ St. Athanasius did not adopt the earlier Greek patristic distinction between the terms *εἰκὼν* and *ὁμοίωσις*; cf. R. Bernard, *L'image de Dieu d'après Saint Athanase* (*Théologie* XXV, Paris, 1952), 27 ff. The altogether infrequent use of the term and concept of *homoiosis* in Athanasius' anthropology — cf. Bernard, *op. cit.*, 28 f. — would seem to reflect the terminology of his trinitarian doctrine which rejected the term *ὁμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν* as too weak to express

semblance, likeness — is no doubt due to the influence of Platonism. Greek early Christian Platonists did not altogether give up the Platonic conception of an image as something inferior or second best if compared to its archetype, the one great exception being, of course, the equal image of God in Christ. The dialectics of like and unlike on the other hand, as it appears in Plato's late dialogues, must have been congenial to Christian thinkers who desired to make use of Platonic formulations in order to illustrate the closest possible relationship between the creature man and the creator God. For it had been one of the main concerns of Platonism to show that, while it is impossible for man to speak of like without unlike, of same without other, of one without many, of being without non-being, this fact does not destroy the positive meaning of a concept such as likeness.¹⁴

One Platonic text above all was of the greatest assistance in this respect to Greek patristic theological anthropology; it is the famous sentence from the *Theatetus*: "Wherefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we can; and to fly away is to become like God, as far as this is possible . . ." (. . . ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν).¹⁵ Clement of Alexandria and Origen used this text.¹⁶ Gregory of Nyssa no doubt knew it and, as Merki has shown to be probable, Gregory also utilized Plotinus' version.¹⁷ In Gregory's thinking at any rate Platonic assimilation to God was fully absorbed into the scriptural doctrine of man's creation and reformation according to the image of God: *eikon* and *homoiosis* were one and the same thing, in the sense that biblical-Platonic *homoiosis* was the content of the creational as well as of the redeemed and restored *eikon*. This doctrine of image-likeness is of interest not only because it has a bearing on the more mystical aspects of Gregory's anthropology, but also be-

the consubstantiality (the ὁμοούσιος) of the Son with the Father, and on the other hand opposed the pretension of any essential resemblance between God and man; cf. Bernard, *op. cit.*, 114 ff. and 29.

¹⁴ For Plato see, especially, *Parmenides* 132D and 148, *Sophist* 259. Cf. La Touche Godfrey, "Plato's Doctrine of Participation," *Hermathena* LXIII (1944), 4; J. Stenzel, *Zahl und Gestalt bei Plato und Aristoteles*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig, Berlin, 1933), 154; H. Cherniss, "Parmenides and the *Parmenides* of Plato," *American Journal of Philology* LIII (1932) 124 f. — The transcendence of the divine nevertheless remains in Platonism as well as in Christianity. For Plotinus see P. Aubin, "L'«image» dans l'oeuvre de Plotin," *Recherches de science religieuse* XLI (1953), 348 ff.

¹⁵ *Theatetus* 176A f.: Διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε φεύγειν ὅ τι τάχιστα. Φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.

¹⁶ See, for instance, Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* V, 14 (94, 5 ff.), *GCS, Clem.Al.* II, 388, cf. Merki, ὍΜΟΙΩΣΙΣ 44 ff.; Origen, *De principiis* III, 6, 1, *GCS, Orig.* V, 280, cf. Crouzel, *op. cit.*, 218 and 261, n. 1, against Merki's surprising assertion (*op. cit.*, 61) that the *homoiosis*-motif was only of secondary importance to Origen.

¹⁷ Plotinus, *Enneads* I, 2, 1, 1, I, 2, 3 ff. See the comparison with Gregory of Nyssa, *De oratione dominica*, *PG* XLIV, 1145A f., by Merki, *op. cit.*, 127 f.

cause it forms the basis for his more philosophical considerations in *De hominis opificio*.

This principal anthropological treatise of the Bishop of Nyssa is not a work of biblical exegesis in the strict sense, but rather a *logos*, as Gregory himself calls it,¹⁸ a discourse in the vein of Origen's *De principiis* or Philo's *De opificio mundi*. The relation to Philo's work is in fact quite close, as will be seen.

The very plan of *De hominis opificio* proves that the apparent antinomy between man's perfect creational image-likeness to God and his partly corporeal nature really is a central problem of Gregory of Nyssa's anthropology. For, in the first part of the book,¹⁹ he beautifully praises man's creation according to God's image, showing that man's physical nature is only a reflection of his spiritual resemblance to God; then, halfway through the treatise, he rather suddenly contrasts man's high origin with his present misery, as apparent in the deficiencies of his corporeal condition; to the explanation of this contrast most of the remainder of the work is dedicated.²⁰ Though this second part, which deals with the loss and the restoration in the Christian dispensation of man's image-likeness to God, contains Gregory's most original contributions to Christian philosophical anthropology, the first part lays the indispensable foundations. It describes and defines the image-likeness on the creational level, including the instrumental or teleological relationship of man's body to his mind, and then probes more deeply into this relationship by investigating the threefold nature of the soul and its temporal and spatial unity.

In the two opening chapters of the *De hominis opificio*, the reader is given a picture of the beauty of non-human nature which waits for its master, man.²¹ Then, with the creation of man, something altogether new and different begins. This is indicated according to Gregory by the deliberative announcement made by God before he created man:

"Let us make man to our image and likeness."²²

Here God does not only say: *Γενηθήτω, Fiat*, "Let there be," but in view of the importance of the event, He takes counsel with Himself. The plural, "Let us make," Gregory interprets according to an old patristic tradition as

¹⁸ In dedicating the work to his brother Peter Gregory says: τὸ δὲ δῶρον λόγος ἐστίν . . . (PG XLIV, 125B).

¹⁹ Chapters 1–15, PG XLIV, 128C–177C.

²⁰ Chapters 16–27, PG XLIV, 177D–229A. For the last three chapters, 28–30, see *infra* pp. 86 ff.

²¹ *De hominis opificio* 1 f., PG XLIV, 127C f.; cf. Philo, *De opificio mundi* 25 f. (77 f.), ed. L. Cohn, *Philonis Alexandrini Opera Quae Supersunt*, edd. L. Cohn and P. Wendland, I (Berlin, 1896), 25 ff.

²² Genesis 1:26; *De hom. op.* 3, *loc. cit.*, 133C ff.

referring to the divine Trinity.²³ Then he defines the content of the image-likeness and asserts that the resemblance with God is essentially spiritual.

“The Godhead,” he says, “is Mind (Νοῦς) and Word (Λόγος), so also in yourself you see word or speech (τὸν λόγον) and intellect or thought (διάνοιαν), an imitation of Him who is truly Mind and Word.”²⁴

There can be no similarity between divine simplicity and the multiplicity of human sense perception,²⁵ man is like God through similitude to aspects of God’s spiritual life in which he can participate, such as purity (καθαρότης), freedom from passions (ἀπάθεια), bliss (μακαριότης), separation from all evil (κακοῦ πάντος ἀλλοτρίωσις), love (ἀγάπη).²⁶ Man’s virtues thus correspond to God’s attributes. As a whole, man is an image of the majesty of God, because he, too, is a king; and he is a king because of the superiority of his soul, which possesses free will, over all other animated beings. Because through his soul man rules himself, he has rulership also over the rest of creation.²⁷ And yet, Gregory of Nyssa tells us that the best artificer made our nature fit for the exercise of rulership not only through our soul, but even through the organization of our body.²⁸

This does not mean that Gregory has in any way an anthropomorphic concept of God or that he retracts from his spiritual conception of the divine image-likeness in man. The relation of body to mind is in his view a teleological one. In this connection he explains man’s apparent inferiority at birth as compared to the animals:

²³ *De hom. op.* 6, *loc. cit.*, 140B f. For the patristic tradition and the exegetical problem see now above all H. H. Somers, S.J., “The Riddle of a Plural (Genesis 1, 26),” *Folia IX* (1955), 63 ff.

²⁴ *De hom. op.* 5, *loc. cit.*, 137B f.: Νοῦς καὶ λόγος ἡ θεϊότης ἐστίν . . . Ὁρᾶς ἐν σεαυτῷ καὶ τὸν λόγον, καὶ διάνοιαν, μίμημα τοῦ ὄντως νοῦ τε καὶ λόγου. Cf. Philo, *De opificio mundi* 23 (69 ff.) ed. Cohn, *loc. cit.*, 23 f. — Similarity to God through the intellectual faculties of the soul is stressed also in Gregory’s *De anima et resurrectione*, PG XLVI, 57B and 89B.

²⁵ *De hom. op.* 6, *loc. cit.*, 137D: Οὐ γάρ ἐστι δυνατόν ἐν τῇ ἀπλότῃ τῆς θεϊότητος τὸ ποικίλον τε καὶ πολυειδὲς τῆς ἀντιληπτικῆς ἐνεργείας κατανοῆσαι.

²⁶ *De hom. op.* 5, *loc. cit.*, 137C.

²⁷ *De hom. op.* 4, *loc. cit.*, 136B ff. It is rather characteristic of the Cappadocians, in fact of Greek patristic image doctrine in general, to take the metaphor of an art image’s resemblance to its model very seriously, and always to return to royal imagery. Gregory of Nyssa, for instance, treats the virtues that make man similar to God as so many colors and iconographical attributes of a king’s portrait which, as it were, constitute the effigy. See *De hom. op.* 4 and 5, *loc. cit.*, 136C–137A; cf. my article “The Concept of the Image in the Greek Fathers and the Byzantine Iconoclastic Controversy,” *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 7 (1953), 12 f. and 20 ff.

²⁸ *De hom. op.* 4, *loc. cit.*, 136B: . . . οἷόν τι σκεῦος εἰς βασιλείας ἐνέργειαν ἐπιτηδεῖον τὴν ἡμέτεραν φύσιν ὁ ἀριστοτέχνης ἐδημιούργησε, τοῖς τε κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν προτερήμασι καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ τοῦ σώματος σχήματι τοιοῦτον εἶναι παρασκεύασας, οἷον ἐπιτηδεῖως πρὸς βασιλείαν ἔχειν.

" . . . man is brought into life bare of natural covering, an unarmed and poor being, destitute of all things useful, worthy it seems to be pitied rather than to be pronounced happy. . . ." ²⁹

But it was just these deficiencies which forced man to exert himself, to use his mind in order to make up for what his body lacked.³⁰ Here the Bishop of Nyssa uses a time-honored topos of ancient philosophy,³¹ but the topos has become part of a much wider and deeper sequence of ideas, which clearly refers the whole corporeal condition of man to his intellectual faculties. For the body's share in divine image-likeness consists essentially in man's upright posture which in an ingenious adaptation of Posidonius ideas Gregory of Nyssa links directly to the function of the hands, indirectly to the origin of language, and ultimately to man's entire spiritual life which makes him the master of creation.

The Bishop of Nyssa's argument runs thus: Man is upright and his gaze is directed upward to heaven. This symbolizes his royal dignity, his power over the other animalic creatures.³² But there is more: Because man stands erect, he does not need forelegs and could develop hands. Only because he has hands, which besides being put to a thousand other uses can serve for the provision and preparation of food, could his mouth, his lips, his tongue, and the other related parts of his face and throat be shaped for the purpose of the articulation of words rather than for such animalic needs as the tearing of grass from the ground or the tearing apart of raw meat.³³ Thus, just be-

²⁹ *De hom. op.* 7, *loc. cit.*, 140D: . . . γυμνὸς μὲν τῶν φυσικῶν σκεπασμάτων ἄσπλος δέ τις καὶ πένης ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν ἐνδεὲς ἀπάντων ἐπὶ τὸν βίον παράγεται, ἐλεείσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μακαρίζεσθαι κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἄξιος.

³⁰ *De hom. op.* 7, *loc. cit.*, 141B-144A.

³¹ Cf. K. Gronau, *Poseidonios und die jüdisch-christliche Genesisexegese* (Leipzig, Berlin, 1914), 153 ff.; E. v. Ivanka, "Die Quelle von Ciceros *De Natura Deorum* II. 45-60 (Poseidonios bei Gregor von Nyssa)," *Egyetemes Philologiai Közlöny (Archivum Philologicum)* LIX (1935), 10 ff., *idem*, "Die Autorschaft der Homilien . . .," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* XXXVI (1936), 46 ff., *idem*, "Die stoische Anthropologie in der Lateinischen Literatur," *Anzeiger der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Philos.-histor. Kl. LXXXVII, 1950 (1951), 178 ff.; K. Reinhardt, article "Poseidonios," in Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (hereafter PW, RE) XLIII (1953), 721 ff.; Gr. Nyss., *Création*, Laplace-Daniélou, 102, n. 1.

³² *De hom. op.* 8, *loc. cit.*, 144B. Here, too, Gregory of Nyssa uses a wide-spread patristic topos which may or may not depend on Posidonius (not so according to Reinhardt); cf. Gronau, *op. cit.*, 161, 288 f., K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios* (Munich, 1921), 260, *idem*, *Kosmos und Sympathie* (Munich, 1926), 144 ff., *idem*, article "Poseidonios," in PW, RE XLIII, 714 ff., 723 f., v. Ivanka, "Die Quelle von Cicero . . .," *loc. cit.*, 14, *idem*, "Die stoische Anthropologie . . .," *loc. cit.* 182, 185, 189 f., Gr. Nyss., *Création*, Laplace-Daniélou, 19 ff., 106 ff.

³³ *De hom. op.* 8, *loc. cit.*, 144B f.: . . . τῇ τοῦ λόγου χρεῖα συνεργός ἐστιν ἡ τῶν χειρῶν ὑπουργία. Καὶ τις ἴδιον τῆς λογικῆς φύσεως τὴν τῶν χειρῶν ὑπερσίαν εἰπὼν οὐ τοῦ παντὸς ἀμαρτήσεται . . . *Loc cit.*, 148C-149A: Διὰ τοῦτο συνηρτήθησαν αἱ χεῖρες τῷ σώματι. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ μυρίας ἔστιν ἀριθμῆσασθαι τὰς κατὰ τὸν βίον χρεῖας . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων διαφερόντω, τοῦ λόγου χάριν προσέθηκεν αὐτὰς ἡ φύσις τῷ σώματι. Εἰ γὰρ ἄμοιρος τῶν χειρῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦν, πάντως ἂν

cause man in his mind was made similar to God he received from the creator also the physical gifts suitable for the spiritual image-likeness. That sequence of cause and effect which led from man's upright posture via the creation of hands to the eminently spiritual gift of language also brought about the formation of a whole complex of vocal organs, comparable to a combination of lyre and flute, through which his mind can express itself, as a musician on his instrument.³⁴

There is little doubt that in this whole part of *De hominis opificio*, as in some other physiological metaphors and examples which he uses, Gregory of Nyssa, notwithstanding his general Platonism, was influenced by Stoic thought, in part at least through the Posidonian tradition.³⁵ Yet, his manner of tying the theory of the mind's instrumental use of the body to the doctrine of spiritual image-likeness is his own; it is not found even in Philo, who was so often his immediate source. Thus, while Philo with reference to the creation of man's body says only that God chose the purest earth to mold the house or temple which was to harbor the reasonable soul,³⁶ Gregory gives a detailed account of how body and mind cooperate through sense perception, imagination, and conceptualization. This cooperation, however, the effectiveness of the one mind in all the various sense perceptions, is something so mysterious that he can explain it only through the very image-likeness of the mind to God: the nature of the human mind is as incomprehensible as the essence of God Himself.³⁷

Gregory of Nyssa's reasoning on the body-mind relationship is important, especially because the relatively close bond, which he recognized, between man's mortal body — it, too, a creature of God — and the divine immortal image in the spiritual or rational soul, greatly enhances the dignity

αὐτῷ καθ' ὁμοιότητα τῶν τετραπόδων καταλλήλως τῇ τῆς τροφῆς χρεία διεσκευάστο τοῦ προσώπου τὰ μόρια . . . πρὸς τὴν ἀναίρεσιν τῆς πόας ἐπιτηδείως ἔχοντα, ἐγκείσθαι δὲ τοῖς ὁδοῦσι τὴν γλῶσσαν ἄλλην τινὰ τοιαύτην πολύσαρκον καὶ ἀντιτυπῇ καὶ τραχείαν καὶ συγκατεργαζομένην τοῖς ὁδοῦσι τὸ ὑπὸ τὸν ὀδόντα γινόμενον . . . Νυνὶ δὲ τῆς χειρὸς ἐντεθείσης τῷ σώματι εὐσυχολόν ἐστι τὸ στόμα τῇ ὑπερεσία τοῦ λόγου . . .

³⁴ *De hom. op.* 9, *loc. cit.*, 149C–152A: Σύμμικτος δέ τις ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ὄργανον αὐλοῦ καὶ λύρας ὥσπερ ἐν συνωδίᾳ τινι κατὰ ταῦτὸν ἀλλήλοις συμφθεγγομένων . . . , and a detailed comparison of the respiratory and facial organs with flute and lyre.

³⁵ See Gronau, *op. cit.*, 158 ff., Reinhardt, article "Poseidonios," in *PW, RE XLIII*, 723 ff., *id.*, *Kosmos und Sympathie* 139 ff., v. Ivanka, "Die Quelle von Cicero . . . ," *loc. cit.* — Since in all details concerning the physical constitution of man Gregory of Nyssa, just as Nemesius of Emesa, is directly dependent on Galen (cf. *infra* p. 78), it would not seem unlikely that the Gregorian text regarding the vocal organs, quoted in the preceding note, was influenced by Galen's lost work *Περὶ φωνῆς* (mentioned in his *De libris propriis*, ed. C. G. Kühn, *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia* XIX [Leipzig, 1830], 13). — The same Posidonian-Galenian tradition must have been present to Basil; cf. *Homil. in illud: Attende tibi ipsi* 8, *PG XXXI*, 216 f.

³⁶ *De opificio mundi* 47 (137), ed. Cohn, *loc. cit.*, 47 f.

³⁷ *De hom. op.* 11, *loc. cit.*, 153C–156B. Cf. also Basil, *Homil. in illud: Attende tibi ipsi*, *loc. cit.*

of the whole man. His conception of man's spiritual-material nature was based on two fundamental assumptions, already briefly referred to. These are the threefold nature of the soul in its relationship to matter and to spirit and the temporal and spatial unity of the human soul, in which mind and body exist as unified, notwithstanding the great distance which separates them in the hierarchy of values.

In Gregory of Nyssa's view man contains in himself all previous stages of living creatures.

"For," he says "this rational animal, man, is mixed from every idea of soul. He is nourished in accordance with the vegetative species of soul; but, in addition to the [vegetative] faculty of growth, there arose that of sense perception [characteristic of animals], which stands in the middle between the proper natures of the intellectual and the more material nature. . . ; then there takes place a certain appropriation as well as a blending of the intellectual essence to the fine and luminous part of the sensible nature, so that man is constituted by all three [souls]. . . ." ³⁸

This threefold classification of souls is ultimately derived from Aristotle. ³⁹ Gregory does not integrate it with the Platonic three soul parts, the appetitive, the irascible, and the rational, ⁴⁰ which he took over elsewhere in different contexts. ⁴¹ He does, however, relate the three soul forms of *De hominis opificio* to the Pauline concepts of body, soul, and spirit, ⁴² so that man's body corresponds to the life of the plants, man's soul to animal life,

³⁸ *De hom. op.* 8, *loc. cit.*, 145C: Δια πάσης γὰρ ιδέας τῶν ψυχῶν κατακινῶνται τὸ λογικὸν τοῦτο ζῶον ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Τρέφεται μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ φυσικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος· τῇ δὲ αὐξητικῇ δυνάμει ἡ αἰσθητικὴ προσεφύη, μέσως ἔχοντα κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν τῆς τε νοερᾶς καὶ τῆς ὑλωδεστέρας οὐσίας Εἰτά τις γίνεται πρὸς τὸ λεπτὸν καὶ φωτεινὸν τῆς αἰσθητικῆς φύσεως ἡ τῆς νοερᾶς οὐσίας οἰκείωσις τε καὶ ἀνάκρασις, ὡς ἐν τρισὶ τούτοις τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν. . . . Cf. also *De anima et resurrectione*, PG XLVI, 60A ff., where Gregory uses the terms λογικός and διανοητικός instead of νοερός.

³⁹ This was noticed also by H. Meyer, *Geschichte der Lehre von den Keimkräften von der Stoa bis zum Ausgang der Patristik* (Bonn, 1914, hereafter Meyer, *Keimkräfte*), 115, n. 1, 119 f., and by Völker, *Gregor* 62. — See, especially, Aristotle, *De anima* II, 3, 414a; Aristotle's classification is more elaborate than Gregory's: he distinguishes, among the δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς, the θρεπτικόν, the ὀρεκτικόν, the αἰσθητικόν, the κινητικόν κατὰ τὸν τόπον, and the διανοητικόν.

⁴⁰ See, for instance, *Republic* IV, 441.

⁴¹ *Epistula canonica* 1-2, PG XLV, 224A: Τρία ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν θεωρούμενα κατὰ τὴν πρώτην διαίρεσιν τό τε λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές. See also *De hom. op.* 29, *loc. cit.*, 237B; *Adversus Apollinarem* 8, PG XLV, 1140A f.; *De vita Mosis*, PG XLIV, 361C f. Cf. Cherniss, *Platonism* 15; M. Pellegrino, "Il Platonismo di San Gregorio Nisseno nel Dialogo «Intorno all' anima e alla resurrezione», " *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* XXX (1938), 446 f.

⁴² 1 Thessalonians 5:23; cf. 1 Corinthians 2:13 and 14-16, 3:1, 15:44.

and his spirit to the life of the intellect.⁴³ No wonder then that man's creation is mentioned last among the works of God by Holy Scripture, for

“nature makes the ascent, as it were, by steps (*διὰ βαθμῶν*) . . . from the smaller things to that which is perfect.”⁴⁴

More than forty years ago, it was shown by W. Jaeger in his path-finding book on *Nemesius of Emesa*,⁴⁵ and later also by Karl Reinhardt,⁴⁶ that the conception of a universe ascending in steps from inanimate nature through the various forms of life to God corresponds to the Posidonian version of Stoic monism and pantheism.⁴⁷ In Gregory of Nyssa as well as in *Nemesius* this conception blends with the Platonistic *syndesmos*-doctrine of man as a link (*δεσμός*), as an in-between (*μεθόριος*) between the animalic and the divine.⁴⁸ The latter doctrine is found also in Gregory Nazianzen who

⁴³ *De hom. op.* 8, *loc. cit.*, 145C: . . . καθὼς καὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἀποστόλου τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐμάθομεν, ἐν οἷς πρὸς τοὺς Ἑφείσιους ἔφη, προσευχόμενος αὐτοῖς τὴν ὀλοτελή χάριν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ Κυρίου φυλαχθῆναι, ἀντὶ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ μέρους τὸ σῶμα λέγων, τὸ δὲ αἰσθητικὸν τῇ ψυχῇ διασημαίνων, τὸ νοερὸν δὲ τῷ πνεύματι . . . See also the Pauline trichotomy of σάρκινος, ψυχικός, πνευματικός in *Adversus Apollinarem* 46, PG XLV, 1236A, where Gregory refers to I Thessalonians 5:23 and to II Corinthians 2:13 ff. — It would then not be quite correct to say that Gregory of Nyssa is altogether opposed to anthropological or even to psychological trichotomism. He opposes only that version of it that, following Apollinaris of Laodicea, holds it possible to separate the rational from the irrational part of the soul (cf. *Adversus Apollinarem* 8, *loc. cit.*, 1140A f.) and to dissolve the unity between mind, soul, and body (*Adv. Apollin.* 46, *loc. cit.*, 1236B). For Apollinaris of Laodicea see O. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur* III, 2nd ed. (Freiburg i.B., 1923), 285 ff.; for the philosophical background of the pre-monophysite Apollinarist heresy, which asserted that in Christ the Logos took the place of the soul, or at least of the rational soul, see now H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers* I (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), 433 ff.; for Apollinaris' ultimate theological intentions cf. H. de Riedmatten, O.P., “La christologie d'Apollinaire de Laodicée,” *Studia Patristica* II (1957) 208 ff.

⁴⁴ *De hom. op.* 8, *loc. cit.*, 148B f.: . . . καθάπερ διὰ βαθμῶν ἡ φύσις . . . ἀπὸ τῶν μικροτέρων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλειον ποιεῖται τὴν ἀνοδὸν. Cf. *ibid.*, 145B: . . . ὁδῶ τιμὴ πρὸς τὸ τέλειον ἀκολουθῶς προϊούσης τῆς φύσεως.

⁴⁵ W. Jaeger, *Nemesios von Emesa* (Berlin, 1914, hereafter Jaeger, *Nemesios*).

⁴⁶ Reinhardt, *Poseidonios* 247 ff., 343 ff., *id.*, *Kosmos und Sympathie* 320 ff., *id.*, article “Poseidonios,” in PW, RE XLIII, 701 f., 773 ff.

⁴⁷ Since E. Skard, “Nemesiosstudien II,” *Symbolae Osloenses* XVII (1937), 9 ff., has proved that Galen was here the mediator between Posidonius and *Nemesius*, and since Gregory of Nyssa has often used Galen (see *infra*, p. 78), the latter probably was the direct source also for Gregory's *bathmos*-doctrine; the doctrine is related, of course, to Aristotle's teaching on nature's progress κατὰ μικρόν from inanimate life via plant life to animalic life; see *Histor. animal.* VIII, 1, 588b, and cf. note 39.

⁴⁸ See *De hom. op.* 16, *loc. cit.*, 181B f.: Δύο τινῶν κατὰ τὸ ἀκρότατον πρὸς ἄλληλα διεστηκότων μέσον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, τῆς τε θείας καὶ ἀσωμάτου φύσεως καὶ τῆς ἀλόγου καὶ κτηνώδους ζωῆς . . . Ἐκάτερον γὰρ τούτων ἐστὶ πάντως ἐν παντὶ τῷ μετέχοντι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ζωῆς. See also, for instance, *Oratio catechetica* 6, ed. Srawley, *loc. cit.*, 29 f., *De infantibus qui praemature abripiuntur*, PL XLVI, 173 ff.; *Nemesius of Emesa, De natura hominis*, PG XL, 508, 512A-C, 513B. Cf. Philo, *De opificio mundi* 46 (135), ed. Cohn, *loc. cit.*, 47: διὸ καὶ κυρίως ἂν τις εἴποι τὸν ἄνθρωπον θνητῆς καὶ ἀθανάτου φύσεως εἶναι μεθόριον, ἐκατέρας ὅσον ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι μετέχοντα, καὶ γεγενῆσθαι θνητὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀθάνατον, θνητὸν μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀθάνατον.

speaks of God as tying together earth and spirit in man, who thus becomes a mean between greatness and lowness.⁴⁹ But here again the great Cappadocians successfully transformed ancient theorems in a Christian sense. Gregory of Nyssa, especially, not only applied, in his ascetical works, the *bathmos*-concept to man's mystical ascent to God,⁵⁰ but, as a philosopher, achieved also a real synthesis between the Posidonian-Neoplatonic view of cosmical order and the Christian doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*. This synthesis is both cosmological and anthropological, and incidentally is of some interest for the question of possible patristic anticipations of biological evolution doctrine.⁵¹

In his *Homilies on the Hexaemeron*, that is, on the six-day-work of creation, sermons which were intended to defend and to supplement St. Basil's work on the Hexaemeron, Gregory had already interpreted the six days not literally, but had spoken of simultaneous creation.⁵² The conception of creation as simultaneous he probably took over from Philo.⁵³ Yet Gregory differed from Philo in one important respect. For Philo simultaneous creation had occurred both ideally in the mind of God and actually in the making of the sensible universe after the ideal pattern. The Genesis-account of God's six-day-work, according to Philo, first describes ideal creation, which is called the first day, and then actual, sensible, or corporeal, creation to which the other five days correspond. Nevertheless, it was in one creational instant that all the works of God made their appearance. The six days only indicate a perfect logical order which adumbrates the post-creational growth of all living beings from matter to seed and fruit.⁵⁴

For other Philonian tests cf. Jaeger, *Nemesios*, 140 f., and Reinhardt, article "Poseidonios," in PW, RE XLIII, 773 ff. In spite of Reinhardt's contradiction the *syndesmos*-doctrine, too, seems to be of Posidonian origin, and, together with other Posidonian and Philonian ideas, seems to have been transmitted to the Cappadocians and to Nemesius through Origen's lost commentary to Genesis; cf. Jaeger, *Nemesios*, 96 ff., 138 ff., Skard, "Nemesiosstudien I," *Symbolae Osloenses* XV-XVI (1936), 23 ff.

⁴⁹ Gregory Nazianzen, *Oratio* XXXVIII, 11, PG XXXVI, 321C ff. (identically also in *Oratio* XLV, 7, PG XXXVI, 629D ff.): on man as image of God οἷόν τινα κόσμον δεύτερον ἐν μικρῷ μέγαν . . . ἄγγελον ἄλλον, προσκυνητὴν μικτόν, ἐπόπτην τῆς ορατῆς κτίσεως, μύστην τῆς νοουμένης, βασιλέα τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς βασιλευόμενον ἄνωθεν . . . μέσον μεγέθους καὶ ταπεινότητος. *Oratio* XXXII, 9, *ibid.*, 184C: Τάξις ἐκ λογικοῦ τε καὶ αλόγου κράματος τὸν ἄνθρωπον ζῶον λογικὸν συνεστήσατο· καὶ συνέδησε μυστικῶς τε καὶ ἀρρητῶς τὸν χοῦν τῷ νοὶ καὶ τὸν νοῦν τῷ πνεύματι.

⁵⁰ Jaeger, *Rediscovered Works* 79.

⁵¹ See *infra* p. 75, note 66.

⁵² Gregory of Nyssa, *In Hexaemeron*, PG XLIV, 69A-72C. For the relation between Gregory's and Basil's works see now E. Corsini, "Nouvelles perspectives sur le problème des sources de l'Hexaëmeron de Grégoire de Nysse," *Studia Patristica* I (1957), 94 ff.

⁵³ Cf. *De opificio mundi* 3(13), 7(28), and 22(67), ed. Cohn, *loc. cit.*, 4, 8, and 22.

⁵⁴ For the first day (the ideal pattern, the νοητὸς ἰδέα) see *De opificio mundi* 4(16)-9(35), ed. Cohn 4-11; for days two to six (the sensible, corporeal world, the κόσμος αἰσθητός, a copy,

Gregory of Nyssa on the other hand posited a “seminal power,” instituted by God in the first creative impulse and instant, whence all the various creational works, that is to say, even those of the original six days themselves were to make their appearance later, according to an ordered and necessary succession in time.⁵⁵ Gregory’s exegesis of the six days is thus as non-literal as Philo’s, but in a different sense. Contrary to Philo, he distinguished between an only potential or virtual existence of all things when they were simultaneously created, and their actual successive or temporal emergence. This seems to be the earliest clear occurrence in hexameral literature of the idea of a “seminal power” or “reason,”⁵⁶ which Gregory, and later Augustine, could find in ancient philosophy.⁵⁷ In *De hominis*

μίμημα, ἀπεικόνισμα, of the intelligible archetype) see *ibid.*, 10(36 ff.), ed. Cohn 11 ff.; for the hexaemeron as an adumbration (ὑπεγράφετο) of the post-creational order of development see *ibid.*, 22(67 f.), ed. Cohn 22 f.; for the perfection of the number six itself and its relation to the even more perfect seven of the Sabbath see *ibid.*, 3(13 f.) and 30(89 ff.), ed. Cohn 4 and 31 ff., also *Legum allegoria* I, 2(2 ff.), ed. Cohn, *loc. cit.*, 61 ff. — Cf. H. A. Wolfson, *Philo*, I, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), 310 ff.

⁵⁵ In *Hexaemeron*, PG XLIV, 72B f.: . . . ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κοσμογονίας ὑποτίθεται, ὅτι πάντων τῶν ὄντων τὰς ἀφορμὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις συλλήβδην ὁ Θεὸς ἐν ἀκαρεῖ κατεβάλλετο καὶ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τοῦ θελήματος ὁρμῇ ἡ ἐκάστου τῶν ὄντων οὐσία συνέδραμεν Τῇ δὲ συγκαταβληθείσῃ δυνάμει τε καὶ σοφίᾳ πρὸς τὴν τελείωσιν ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων τοῦ κόσμου εἰρμός τις ἀναγκαῖος κατὰ τινὰ τάξιν ἐπηκολούθησεν . . . κατὰ τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἀκολουθίας, οὐκ αὐτομάτῳ τινὶ συντυχίᾳ Ἄλλ’ ὡς ἡ ἀναγκαῖα τῆς φύσεως τάξις ἐπιζητεῖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις ἀκολουθῶν, οὕτως ἕκαστα γεγενῆσθαι φησιν . . . (for the various meanings of the concept of ἀκολουθία in Gregory of Nyssa see J. Daniélou, S.J., “Akolouthia chez Grégoire de Nyse,” *Revue des sciences religieuses* XXVII [1953], 219 ff.) *Ibid.*, 77D: . . . τῇ μὲν δυνάμει τὰ πάντα ἦν ἐν πρώτῃ τοῦ Θεοῦ περὶ τὴν κτίσιν ὁρμῇ, οἷον ἐστὲρματικῆς τινος δυνάμεως πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πάντος γένεσιν καταβληθείσης, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον οὕτω ἦν. *De hom. op.* 29, PG XLIX, 236A f. . . . ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σίτῳ φαμέν ἡ ἐν ἐτέρῳ τινὶ τῶν σπερμάτων ἅπαν ἐμπεριελήφθαι τῇ δυνάμει τὸ κατὰ τὸν στάχυν εἶδος τὸν χορτόν . . . τὸν καρπὸν . . . , καὶ οὐδὲν τούτων ἐν τῇ τῆς φύσεως λόγῳ προϋπάρχειν ἢ προγίνεσθαι φαμέν τῇ φύσει τοῦ σπέρματος, ἀλλὰ τάξει μὲν τινὶ φυσικῇ τὴν ἐγκειμένην τῷ σπέρματι δύναμιν φανεροῦσθαι . . . , κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σπόραν ὑπελήφμεν ἔχειν ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῆς συστάσεως ἀφορμῇ συνεσπαρμένην τὴν τῆς φύσεως δύναμιν *Ibid.*, 240A f.: . . . Καὶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν καρπῶν τὰς ἐντερύωνας καὶ τὰς τῶν ῥίζων ἀποσπάδας οὐ νεκρωθείσας τῆς ἐγκειμένης τῇ φύσει ζωτικῆς δυνάμεως τῇ γῇ καταβάλλομεν Ὅπερ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν γινέσθαι, μὴ τινος φυσικῆς δυνάμεως συνεντεθείσης

⁵⁶ Though Gregory does not seem to use the term λόγος σπερματικός itself, the way in which, in *De hom. op.*, he combines the expressions ὁ τῆς φύσεως λόγος and ἡ ἐγκειμένη τῷ σπέρματι δύναμις indicates that he was familiar with the concept of “seminal reasons.”

⁵⁷ For Plotinus’ λόγοι σπερματικοί and γεννητικοί cf. *Enneads* II, 3, 16 f. and IV, 4, 16; for Stoic λόγοι σπερματικοί cf. Preisigke, article “Logos (Psychologie, Metaphysik),” in PW, RE XIII, 1 (1926), 1055 ff. For the related concept of ζωτικὴ δύναμις (possibly Poseidonian), which occurs also in Gregory’s *De hom. op.* 29 (see *supra*), cf. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios*, 242 ff., *id.*, *Kosmos und Sympathie* 329, *id.*, article “Poseidonios,” in PW, RE XLIII, 648 f. Cf. also J. P. Cavarnos, “Gregory of Nyssa on the Nature of the Soul,” *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review* I (1955), 139 and 141, to *De hom. op.* 15, *loc. cit.*, 177A, where ἐνέργεια ζωτικὴ is contrasted with the rational soul. — Philo, *De opificio mundi* 13(43 f.), ed. Cohn 13 f., has the concept of οὐσίαι or λόγοι σπερματικοί, but only with reference to the emergence of fruits from seeds. In general see Meyer, *Keimkräfte*, esp. 108 ff. for Gregory

opificio Gregory applied this principle to the development of the human soul.

It is through his theory of the simultaneous creation and successive appearance of the three kinds of souls and of the bodies appertaining to them — the nutritive soul corresponding to plants, the sensitive soul to animals, the rational soul to man — that Gregory of Nyssa is able to preserve the unity between the material and the spiritual part of man: it would be as wrong to assume that in man these three souls exist in a mixture of distinct entities⁵⁸ as it would be to believe that man's body and soul, even Adam's did not make their appearance together.⁵⁹ We must imagine Adam's actual appearance in body and mind as a terminal event, comparable to the emergence of the perfected rational state in every post-Adamitic man after a long development from the embryonic to the mature stage.⁶⁰ Only the rational soul is the full and true soul created as such in the beginning, but not immediately apparent;⁶¹ in order to become what it really is, it must traverse the logically earlier stages of the plant-like and animal-like souls;⁶² therefore, in the Genesis-account of timeless creation, plants and animals are mentioned before man.⁶³ Just as every man's soul was made virtually or potentially in the original instant of creation, so was his body, but the actual union between the human soul and body took and takes place anew in every individual case. In Adam it occurred when "from the clay of the ground the Lord God formed man, breathed into his nostrils the

of Nyssa, 102 f. for adumbrations of Gregory's doctrine in Origen, and 80 ff. about Justin's altogether different conception of the λόγος σπερματικός as presence of the divine Logos in the world.

⁵⁸ *De hom. op.* 14 f., *loc. cit.*, 176A–176D.

⁵⁹ *De hom. op.* 29, *loc. cit.*, 236B: "Ὡς μήτε ψυχὴν πρὸ τοῦ σώματος, μήτε χωρὶς ψυχῆς τὸ σῶμα ἀληθὲς εἶναι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μίαν ἀμφοτέρων ἀρχὴν κατὰ μὲν τὸν ὑψηλότερον λόγον, ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ βουλήματι καταβληθείσαν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἕτερον ἐν ταῖς τῆς γενέσεως ἀφορμαῖς συνισταμένην. *De anima et resurrectione*, PG XLVI, 125C: Δείπεται οὖν μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος ἀρχὴν τῆς συστάσεως οἰέσθαι . . . and the continuation of the argument to 128A. Cf. also E. Stéphanou, "La coexistence initiale du corps et de l'âme d'après Saint Grégoire de Nysse et Saint Maxime l'Homologue," *Échos d'orient* XXXI (1932), 304 ff.

⁶⁰ Cf. *de hom. op.* 29, *loc. cit.*, 236C–237C.

⁶¹ *De hom. op.* 15, *loc. cit.*, 177A.

⁶² *De anima et resurrectione*, PG XLVI, 125C: "Ὡς περ οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν φνομένων σπερμάτων κατὰ λόγον ἢ αὔξησις ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος πρόεισι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης συστάσεως πρὸς λόγον τῆς σωματικῆς ποσότητος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς διαφαίνεται δύναμις· πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ καὶ αὐξητικοῦ τοῖς ἔνδοθεν πλασσομένοις ἐγγινωμένη· μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν χάριν τοῖς εἰς φῶς προελθοῦσιν ἐπάγουσα, εἴθ' οὕτω καθάπερ τινὰ καρπὸν αὐξηθέντος ἤδη τοῦ φυτοῦ μετρίως τὴν λογικὴν ἐμφαίνουσα δύναμιν, οὐ πᾶσαν κατὰ τὸ ἀθρώον, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀναδρομῇ τοῦ φυτοῦ δι' ἀκολουθίου προκοτῆς συνανξομένην. Cf. also *De hom. op.* 29, *loc. cit.* 237B: in the embryo the λογικόν, the θυμοειδές, and the ἐπιθυμητικόν, though present, cannot yet be distinguished.

⁶³ *De hom. op.* 8, *loc. cit.*, 144C ff.

breath of life and made man a living soul" (Genesis 2:7); ⁶⁴ in later men this union is realized at the moment of their conception, ⁶⁵ though, as mentioned above, their soul is then not yet actually rational. ⁶⁶

Gregory of Nyssa's elaboration of the doctrine of a *σπερματική δύναμις* enables him to explain how spirit and body in spite of their very unequal relationship to God can and must coexist in man. He thus overcomes the radically dualistic doctrines of the pre-existence of souls and of metempsychosis, which he rejects explicitly. ⁶⁷ At the same time in clearly stating the created character of the seminal power as a "natural principle" (*φύσεως λόγος*), ordained by God, he maintains a moderate Christian dualism against the Heraclitan-Stoic-Posidonian conception of universal sympathy in a graded cosmos lacking true distinction between God and man. The human soul is neither forever material as well as divine, as it is for the Stoics, nor is it originally created purely spiritual and divine as for the Platonists. It is rather the vital link, the true *syndesmos*, between matter and spirit from the beginning. The explication in time of the timeless moment of creation proceeds from matter to spirit through the soul of man,

⁶⁴ That this union took place at the moment referred to in Genesis 2:7 is implied in *De hom. op.* 28, *loc. cit.*, 229C, and 29, *loc. cit.*, 233D.

⁶⁵ *De hom. op.* 27, *loc. cit.*, 229A.

⁶⁶ What is the relation of Gregory of Nyssa's development of the concept of "seminal powers" in the frame of a Christian doctrine of creation to philosophical and theological interpretations of biological evolution? His and St. Augustine's slightly different views have often been adduced by those who have tried to reconcile evolutionist theory and Christian theology. Cf., for instance, J. A. Zahm, C.S.C., *Evolution and Dogma* (Chicago, 1896); H. de Dorlodot, *Le darwinisme au point de vue de l'orthodoxie catholique* (Brussels, Paris, 1921); E. C. Messenger, *Evolution and Theology* (New York, 1932). Yet, it has been rightly objected that the seminal powers or reasons are principles of fixity rather than of evolution. Cf., especially, Meyer, *Keimkräfte*, 184 ff.; L. Rebecchi, "L'antropologia naturale di San Gregorio Nisseno," *Divus Thomas* XLVI (Piacenza, 1943), esp. 309 ff.; C. Boyer, S.J., "La théorie augustinienne des raisons séminales," *Miscellanea Agostiniana* II (1931), 795 ff.; J. O'Toole, C.S.C., *The Philosophy of Creation in the Writings of St. Augustine* (Washington, D.C., 1944). So, for instance, Gregory of Nyssa considers man's soul and body as logically and "historically" posterior to the bodies and souls of animals, but he never thought of interpreting the shaping of man from earth according to Genesis 2:7 as a metaphor for the descent of man's body, much less of his soul, from those of animals. With regard to the human body it may nevertheless be possible to prolong Gregory's and Augustine's thinking along the lines of evolutionist thought. Under the impact of the facts ascertained by modern genetics, and especially by the study of heredity and mutation, some modifications of Darwin's theory of evolution do come rather close to the Gregorian and Augustinian conceptions of the origin and history of life in general. If it is assumed that the origin of new species cannot be explained by natural selection alone, but presupposes unpredictable mutations, such a view seems less incompatible with patristic ideas on "seminal reasons," which combine creational origin and evolutionary novelty of species. Any newly emergent species could then be conceived as novel, not with regard to God's original plan, but with regard to actual appearance in time and as compared to previous species.

⁶⁷ Cf. *De hom. op.* 28, *loc. cit.*, 232A-233B.

just as in every human being all its corporeal and intellectual potentialities are virtually present in germ-like fashion from the beginning of its existence.

His interrelated doctrines of a threefold soul and of simultaneously created, but temporally unfolding, seminal power assist Gregory of Nyssa in the explanation of the problematic doubleness of man as body and man as spirit. His assertion of the ubiquitousness of the mind as against its localization in any particular part of the body serves a similar purpose. And here again the solution of the psychosomatic problem is based on the close relationship between God and man, which, nevertheless, includes infinite distance between the Creator and the created. Just as the spiritual and the corporeal part of man form a unity in time because they were both potentially created in the simultaneous eternal order of God's creation, so the rational soul ubiquitously pervades the whole body rather than dwells in any of its parts, be it even the most noble parts such as the brain or the heart.⁶⁸ For, made according to the image of a God who cannot be circumscribed, the human mind cannot be restricted in space. Neither is it in the body, nor is the body in it, as Plotinus had taught. It joins the body from the outside in a mysterious way, and vivifies and rules it in its entirety.⁶⁹ As was seen before, the mind's and soul's image-likeness to God consists in part in its mysterious relationship to the body. The very fact that man cannot really circumscribe and comprehend his own mind shows that it is similar to God. Yet, how far removed is man from God in whom being is knowing and willing Himself,⁷⁰ as well as knowledge and love of the world.

Gregory admits that the senses affect the mind through the brain,⁷¹ that the mind can become deranged through physical illness and dulled by somatic conditions,⁷² that dreams are often caused by physical circumstances.⁷³ But when the normal relationship between body and mind is not severed temporarily as in sleep, or disturbed by illness or passion, the life of man, though it cannot exist without the material body, is ruled by the rational soul.⁷⁴ The mind is made according to the image of God and reflects Him as a mirror; so also the physical part of man is made beautiful by

⁶⁸ *De hom. op.* 12, *loc. cit.*, 156C ff.

⁶⁹ *De hom. op.* 15, *loc. cit.*, 177B f.

⁷⁰ For the simultaneity of knowing and willing in God, see Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium* III, 6, 17 f., ed. W. Jaeger, *Gregorii Nysseni Opera* II (Berlin, 1921), 181, and *ibid.*, III, 7, 15 ff., *loc. cit.*, 209.

⁷¹ *De hom. op.* 12, *loc. cit.*, 157C.

⁷² *De hom. op.* 12, *loc. cit.*, 157B f.

⁷³ *De hom. op.* 13, *loc. cit.*, 168C ff.

⁷⁴ *De hom. op.* 12, *loc. cit.*, 164C f.

reflecting this human reflection of the supreme beauty as a mirror's mirror.⁷⁵ Or, as Gregory Nazianzen formulates it:

"What God is to the soul, that the soul becomes for the body: it trains (παιδαγωγήσασα) the body's matter, which is its servant, and adapts the fellow servant to God."⁷⁶

And still, there remain in man passion and vice, there remains illness, above all there remains death. All three great Cappadocians felt these realities profoundly. Perhaps one may say that Gregory of Nazianzus, poet that he was, transcended them in the inspired lyrical expression of his faith;⁷⁷ but only his friend and namesake of Nyssa tried to probe and span the depth of these problems systematically, philosophically as well as mystically. As to St. Basil, his attitude toward the imperfections and transitoriness of terrestrial human life was harsher, his anthropology more severe, than that of the two Gregories. Dom Amand, in his book *L'ascèse monastique de Saint Basile*, has shown very well how uncompromisingly Basil combined an ultra-spiritual Platonist conception of the psychosomatic relationship with the Pauline teaching on the sinfulness of the flesh.⁷⁸ Yet, the difference between his thought and that of the two other great Cappadocians was perhaps not really as great as it may seem. He was rather the active legislator of the very way of life which was their common ideal. His younger brother of Nyssa was its great theoretician. His friend of Nazianzus embraced both *πρᾶξις* and *θεωρία*, but in a very personal way, which was neither that of the hierarch Basil nor that of Gregory of Nyssa, who, though a mystic, was also a systematic thinker. It must be realized, of course, that the practical or active bent of Basil's anthropological thinking was fundamentally ascetic; that is to say, *πρᾶξις* meant for him not practical life in the modern sense, but training in virtue as a preparation for *θεωρία*, the vision of God.⁷⁹ Yet, the practical exigencies of Basil's monastic legislation

⁷⁵ *De hom. op.* 12, *loc. cit.*, 161C f.: "Ὡςπερ δὲ ἔφαμεν τῇ ὁμοιώσει τοῦ πρωτοτύπου κάλλους κατακοσμεῖσθαι τὸν νοῦν οἷόν τι κάτοπτρον τῷ χαρακτήρι τοῦ ἐμφαινομένου μορφούμενον, κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν καὶ τὴν οἰκονομουμένην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἔχεσθαι τοῦ νοῦ λογιζόμεθα καὶ τῷ παρακειμένῳ κάλλει καὶ αὐτὴν κοσμεῖσθαι οἷόν τι κατόπτρον κάτοπτρον λινομένην· κρατεῖσθαι δὲ ὑπὸ ταύτης καὶ συνέχεσθαι τὸ ὕλικόν τῆς ὑποστάσεως περὶ ἣν θεωρεῖται ἡ φύσις."

⁷⁶ Gregory Nazianzen, *Oratio* II, 17, PG XXXV, 428A: ". . . ὅπερ ἐστὶ Θεὸς ψυχῇ τοῦτο ψυχῇ σώματι γένηται, παιδαγωγήσασα δι' ἑαυτῆς τὴν ὑπηρέτιν ὕλην καὶ οἰκείωσασα Θεῷ τὸ ὁμόδουλον."

⁷⁷ The great poetry of Gregory Nazianzen deserves a new study; meanwhile see the excellent pages in G. Misch, *A History of Autobiography in Antiquity* II (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), 600 ff.

⁷⁸ Amand (de Mendieta), *L'ascèse monastique de Saint Basile* 66 ff., 343 ff.

⁷⁹ See, for instance, the lucid exposition of Plagnieux, *Saint Grégoire de Nazianze théologien*, 143 ff.

and of his special responsibilities in the eastern Church, perhaps as much as his personality, prevented him from attaining the anthropological synthesis which his younger brother achieved. Basil's doctrine of man not only rejected what he characteristically called *πολυσαρκία* and *εὐχροια*, the full-bodiedness and good color of a physically perfect athlete,⁸⁰ but also postulated that the demands and even the existence of the body be acknowledged only when absolutely necessary.⁸¹ In spite of its admitted excellence⁸² as a vehicle of the soul,⁸³ the body remains simply a shackle, a prison.⁸⁴ These views of Basil's are relatively narrow when compared with his brother's great attempt to explain why and how man's body is at one and the same time a wonderful creature of God and an occasion for evil.

Even the brief suggestions concerning Gregory Nazianzen and Basil, to which I must here limit myself, are, perhaps, sufficient to show that Cappadocian anthropology indeed reaches its fullness only in Gregory of Nyssa.

Given the problematics of passion, suffering, and death, it is not an accident that a whole section of his *De hominis opificio*, which forms the transition from the first to the second part of the treatise,⁸⁵ and again a final section, which deals with the body-mind relationship in view of the resurrection of the bodies,⁸⁶ are replete with physiological and pathological lore. This material is largely taken from Galen or derived from the Galenian tradition as Reinhardt, Janini Cuesta, and Pères Laplace and Daniélou have, independently, shown.⁸⁷ These medical chapters are, however, by no means a mere display of adventitious knowledge; they lead directly to the central problem of the evils of the body.

Gregory of Nyssa opens the second part of *De hominis opificio*⁸⁸ quite

⁸⁰ *Regulae fusius tractatae* 17, 2, PG XXXI, 964C: 'Ὡς λὰρ τὸν ἀθλητὴν ἡ πολυσαρκία καὶ ἡ εὐχροια χαρακτηρίζει, οὕτω τὸν Χριστιανὸν τὸ κατεσκληκὸς τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἐγκρατείας ἐπανθοῦσα ὥχρια δείκνυσιν, ὅτι ἀθλητῆς ὄντως ἐστὶ τῶν ἐντολῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ. Cf. also *Homil. in illud: Attende tibi ipsi* 3, PG XXXI, 204D; *Homil. in Ps. XXIX*, 6, PG XXIX, 320B ff.

⁸¹ *Homil. ad adolescentes quomodo possint ex gentiliis libris fructum capere* 7, PG XXXI, 581A.

⁸² *Homil. in illud: Attende tibi ipsi* 8, loc. cit., 216C-217B.

⁸³ *Homil. XXI, quod rebus mundanis adhaerendum non sit* . . . 5-6, PG XXXI, 549A ff.

⁸⁴ *Homil. in Ps. XXIX*, 6, PG XXIX, 320C.

⁸⁵ *De hom. op.* 12 ff., loc. cit., 156C ff.

⁸⁶ *De hom. op.* 27 ff., loc. cit., 225A ff.

⁸⁷ Especially from Galen's *De usu partium*; cf. Reinhardt, article "Poseidonios," in PW, RE XLIII, 712 ff.; J. Janini Cuesta, *La antropología y la medicina pastoral de San Gregorio de Nisa* (Madrid, 1946); Gr. Nyss., *Création*, Laplace-Daniélou, 137, n. 1 (to *De hom. op.* 13, loc. cit., 165D) and 228 ff., nn. 1 ff. (to *De hom. op.* 30, loc. cit., 240C). Similarly Nemesius of Emesa has used Galen (and Posidonius through Galen) abundantly; cf. Jaeger, *Nemesios*, 12 ff., Skard, "Nemesiosstudien II, III, IV, V," *Symbolae Osloenses* XVII (1937), 9 ff., XVIII (1938), 31 ff., XIX (1939), 46 ff., and XXII (1942), 40 ff.

⁸⁸ *De hom. op.* 16 ff., loc. cit., 177D ff.

dramatically with an evocation of the tragic aspects of man's actual existence. What he says here is far from mere rhetoric. The tone is sincere, as it is also in similar passages in the *Oratio catechetica* and in *De anima et resurrectione*, and in some of Gregory Nazianzen's great poems, such as *De natura hominis*⁸⁹ and *De animae suae calamitatibus*.⁹⁰ While the first part of Gregory of Nyssa's book *On the Making of Man* was concerned with the essence, so to speak, of man's image-likeness to God, which consists primarily in spirit and mediately in his whole being, the second part deals with the image's pre-existential, existential, and supra-existential destinies; one might almost say with its history, which is a tragedy if considered in the time dimension and, nevertheless, a Dantesque *Divina Comoedia* when its beginning and end are considered.

"What then," Gregory asks in chapter 16 of *De hominis opificio*, "is the meaning of the image? Probably you will say: How can the incorporeal be assimilated to the body, how to the eternal the time-bound, to the immutable that which becomes different by change, to the passionless and immortal the suffering and corruptible, to that which lacks all evil that which constantly dwells with evil and feeds on it. . . ? If the image has resemblance to the original, it is properly called thus; but if the imitation is perverted from its subject, then the thing is something else and not its image. How then is man, this mortal and passionate and shortlived being, an image of the unmixed and pure and ever-being nature?"⁹¹

Death, of course, in itself seems to be the worst negation of God-likeness. In his *Catechetical Oration* Gregory puts himself into the position of a man who, regarding only the dissolution of the body, finds it greatly disturbing, and holds it to be the extremity of evil that our being should be quenched by this condition of mortality.⁹² Similarly, in his treatise *On the Soul and the Resurrection*, which has the form of a dialogue with his dying sister Macrina shortly after the death of their brother, the great Basil, he begins

⁸⁹ Gregory Nazianzen, *Carmina moralia* XIV, *De humana natura*, PG XXXVII, 755 ff.

⁹⁰ *Carmina de seipso* XLV, *De animae suae calamitatibus*. . . . PG XXXVII, 1353 ff.; cf. also *Oratio* VII, in *laudem Caesaris fratris* 19, PG XXXV, 777C ff.

⁹¹ *De hom. op.* 16, *loc. cit.*, 180B: Τίς οὖν ὁ τῆς εἰκόνος λόγος; ἴσως ἔρεις· πῶς ὁμοίωται τῷ σώματι τὸ ἀσώματον; πῶς τῷ αἰδίῳ τὸ πρόσκαιρον; τῷ ἀναλλοιώτῳ τὸ διὰ τροπῆς ἀλλοιούμενον; τῷ ἀπαθεί τε καὶ ἀφθάρτῳ τὸ ἐμπαθὲς καὶ φθειρόμενον; τῷ ἀμυγεί πάσης κακίας τὸ πάντοτε συνοικούν ταύτῃ καὶ συντρεφόμενον; . . . Ἡ γὰρ εἰκὼν, εἰ μὲν ἔχει τὴν πρὸς τὸ πρωτότυπον ὁμοιότητα, κυρίως τοῦτο κατονομάζεται. Εἰ δὲ παρενεχθείη τοῦ προκειμένου ἢ μίμησις, ἄλλο τι καὶ οὐκ εἰκὼν ἐκείνου τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι. Πῶς οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸ θνητὸν τοῦτο καὶ ἐμπαθὲς καὶ ὠκύμορον τῆς ἀκράτου καὶ καθαρᾶς καὶ αἰὲ οὐσης φύσεώς ἐστιν εἰκὼν;

⁹² *Oratio catechetica* 8, ed. Srawley, *loc. cit.*, 41: 'Ἀλλ' ἀγανακτεῖ πάντως ὁ πρὸς τὴν διάλυσιν βλέπων τοῦ σώματος καὶ χαλεπὸν ποιεῖται τῷ θανάτῳ τὴν ζωὴν ἡμῶν διαλύεσθαι

with a vivid description of the common deep-seated abhorrence of death and of all men's instinct and contrivance to avoid it.⁹³

This according to Gregory is the dilemma: On the one hand, the divine word does not lie when it says that man was made according to the image of God. On the other hand, there is no likeness between the misery of human life and the bliss of the impassible life of God. If we compare God and man, it seems that we must necessarily either make God passible or man impassible.⁹⁴ Is there any way out of this impasse?

"Let us then," Gregory says, "take up Holy Scripture itself, to see if through that which is written there we might be led to what we are seeking."⁹⁵

And Scripture does hold an answer for Gregory, as it did for Philo, whom the Bishop of Nyssa here again follows and modifies. This answer lies in the double account of creation in the book of Genesis and in a doctrine of double creation built upon the scriptural foundation.

Philo in *De opificio mundi* states that there is a vast difference between the man formed from earth according to the first part of verse 7 of Genesis 2⁹⁶ and the man after the image of God according to Genesis 1:26.⁹⁷ Philo also identifies the meanings of the first part of Genesis 2:7 and the last part of Genesis 1:27;⁹⁸ for he says that the man formed from earth is also the one who is male or female, according to Genesis 1:27.⁹⁹ He furthermore identifies Genesis 1:26 and the second part of Genesis 2:7;¹⁰⁰ for he says that man was made an ἀπεικόνισμα καὶ μίμημα, a copy and imitation of the

⁹³ *De anima et resurrectione*, PG XLVI, 13A: Πῶς ἔστιν, εἰπον, ἐν ἀνθρώποις τοῦτο (i.e., restraint from sadness about our mortal condition) κατορθωθῆναι οὕτως ἐν ἐκάστῳ φυσικοῦ τινος πρὸς τὸν θάνατον τῆς διαβολῆς ὑπαρχούσης καὶ οὔτε τῶν ὁρώντων τοὺς ἀποθνήσκοντας εὐκόλως καταδεχομένων τὴν θέαν οἷς τε ἂν προσίῃ ὁ θάνατος ἀποφευγόντων ἐφ' ὅσον οἶόν τε; . . . *Ibid.*, 15A: Τί μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι λύπης ἄξιον . . . ὅταν βλέπωμεν τὸν τέως ζώντά τε καὶ φθεγγόμενον ἄπνον καὶ ἀναυδον καὶ ἀκίνητον ἀθρόως γενόμενον καὶ πάντα αὐτῶν σβεσθέντα τὰ φυσικὰ αἰσθητήρια, οὐκ ὄψεως, οὐκ ἀκοῆς ἐνεργούσης, οὐκ ἄλλου τινος ὧν ἡ αἴσθησις τὴν ἀντίληψιν ἔχει;

⁹⁴ *De hom. op.* 16, *loc. cit.*, 180C: Οὔτε ὁ θεὸς ψεύδεται λόγος κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ εἰπὼν γεγενῆσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον· οὔτε ἡ ἐλεεινὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ταλαιπωρία τῇ μακαριότητι τῆς ἀπαθoῦς ζωῆς καθωμοίωται. Ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῶν δύο τὸ ἕτερον ὁμολογεῖσθαι, εἴ τις συγκρίνοι τῷ Θεῷ τὸ ἡμέτερον, ἢ παθητὸν εἶναι τὸ θεῖον ἢ ἀπαθὲς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον . . .

⁹⁵ *De hom. op.* 16, *loc. cit.*, 180D: Οὐκοῦν αὐτὴν ἐπαναληπτέον ἡμῖν τὴν θείαν Γράφην, εἴ τις ἄρα γένοιτο διὰ τῶν γεγραμμένων πρὸς τὸ ζητούμενον χειραγωγία.

⁹⁶ Genesis 2:7: "And the Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth. . . ."

⁹⁷ Genesis 1:26: "And He said: 'Let us make man to our image and likeness. . . .'"

⁹⁸ Genesis 1:27: ". . . male and female He created them."

⁹⁹ Philo, *De opificio mundi* 46 (134), ed. Cohn, *loc. cit.*, 46: . . . ἐναργέστατα καὶ διὰ τούτου παρίστησιν, ὅτι διαφορὰ παμμεγέθης ἐστὶ τοῦ τε νῦν τλασθέντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα Θεοῦ γεγονότος πρότερον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ διαπλασθεὶς αἰσθητὸς ἤδη μετέχων ποιότητος, ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς συνεστώς, ἀνὴρ ἢ γυνή, φύσει θνητός.

¹⁰⁰ Genesis 2:7: ". . . and [God] breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul."

Logos of God, when the divine breath was breathed into his face.¹⁰¹ Philo asserts expressly that the creation of man according to the image and likeness of God as described in Genesis 1:26 was an ideal, a generic, a typical creation, and that man thus created is an intellectual being only, incorporeal, sexless, immortal by nature.¹⁰² The sensible and particular man of Genesis 2:7 on the other hand is a composite creature, consisting of body and mind.¹⁰³ In this composite man, it is only the spiritual soul breathed into man by God which is according to the divine image and likeness. The man of Genesis 1:26 then, he who is pure divine image-likeness, is an idea or a generic intelligible and immortal pattern,¹⁰⁴ which is itself an “imitation” of God or, more exactly, of the *Logos*, of the word and thought of God.¹⁰⁵ This does not mean for Philo that the ideal man was not real; on the contrary, as a good Platonist he believed the ideal to be more real than the sensible-corporeal. Yet, this ideal man was not created separately within the Hexaemeron; the first actual man, Adam, who had an earthly as well as a heavenly part, was: Genesis 1:26, Genesis 1:27, and Genesis 2:7 represent one identical (non-temporal) moment in the six-day-work of creation.

Philo does not tell us why God formed an earthen body for man, a body which is sexually differentiated and mortal. He does not explain why, if God is good, he is also the originator of the corporeal condition of man and of its empirical inferiority to the life of the spirit. But this is the problem which Gregory of Nyssa wants to settle in the same context, and for this purpose he more or less hypothetically,¹⁰⁶ though no doubt with serious intent, advances a doctrine of double creation which significantly differs from that of Philo. For Gregory man’s divine image-likeness is not purely

¹⁰¹ *De opificio mundi* 48 (139), ed. Cohn, *loc. cit.*, 48: . . . ἀπεικόνισμα καὶ μίμημα γεγενῆσθαι τούτου [i.e. τοῦ λόγου] τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐμπνευσθέντα εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον.

¹⁰² *De opificio mundi* 46 (134), ed. Cohn, *loc. cit.*, 46: ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδέα τις ἢ γένος ἢ σφράγις, νοητός, ἀσώματος, οὐτ’ ἄρρεν οὔτε θῆλυ, ἀφθαρτος φύσει.

¹⁰³ Cf. Philo, *Legum allegoria* I, 12, 31, ed. Cohn, *loc. cit.*, 68 f., where the fashioning of Adam from earth according to Genesis 2:7 is interpreted as the creation of the earthly mind, whose blending with the body is taking place but has not yet been completed. According to *Questions and Answers on Genesis* I, 53, ed. R. Marcus (The Loeb Classical Library, Philo, Supplement I [Cambridge, Mass., London, 1953]), 30 f., Adam’s and Eve’s bodies were created even as late as Genesis 3:21; cf. *infra* pp. 88 f.

¹⁰⁴ B. A. Stegmann, O.S.B., *Christ, the “Man from Heaven”: A Study of I Cor. 15:45–47 in the Light of the Anthropology of Philo Judaeus* (The Catholic University of America New Testament Studies VI [Washington, D.C., 1927]) seems to draw too sharp a line between the “ideal” and the “generic” man; see the text quoted *supra* note 102, where ἰδέα and γένος and σφράγις are equivalent; cf. Wolfson, *Philo* I, 204 ff., esp. 206 f., n. 13, on ideas and genera. — See also *De opificio mundi* 51 (146), ed. Cohn, *loc. cit.*, 51, for the mind of every later man as an imprint (ἐκμαγεῖον), fragment (ἀπόσπασμα), reflection (ἀπαύγασμα) of the original ideal pattern of Genesis 1:26.

¹⁰⁵ See note 101. Cf. Wolfson, *Philo* I, 226 ff.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *infra* p. 93.

ideal, nor is the creation of the body merely a fact to be accepted without further explanation.

When Holy Scripture says "God created man according to His image and likeness," it does not speak of Adam nor does it mean a mere idea or abstract genus; it has in mind humanity as a whole, a ὅλον τὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος πλήρωμα, the fullness of all men to come, who are already present to God's foreseeing power, as if they formed one body.¹⁰⁷ Gregory thus transforms Philo's ideal and generic creation of man into a virtual creation of all mankind, a conception which corresponds exactly to his general view of a simultaneous creation unfolding in time. If the creation of man according to Genesis 1:26 included virtually the entire future history of mankind, it is clear that man's creational spirituality must be linked to his eschatological spirituality: this means also that the *pleroma* of mankind will not be fulfilled until in the resurrection of the bodies man's spiritual soul will have been integrated with a body, which, too, has become spiritualized.

Putting aside for the moment the question whether or not Gregory of Nyssa could conceive of a spiritual body of man also in creation, there is no doubt that in his view the body has been bound up ever since Adam's and Eve's original sin with all the potentialities of grossly corporeal passion, in the sense of both suffering and vice. Even though he realizes very clearly that the body cannot be the ultimate cause of evil in the world,¹⁰⁸ he con-

¹⁰⁷ *De hom. op.* 16, *loc. cit.*, 185C: . . . οὕτως οἶμαι καθάπερ ἐν ἐνὶ σώματι ὅλον τὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος πλήρωμα τῇ προγνωστικῇ δυνάμει παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων περισχεθῆναι καὶ τοῦτο διδάσκειν τὸν λόγον τὸν εἰπόντα ὅτι καὶ ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν. *Ibid.*, 17, *loc. cit.*, 189C: . . . ἀθρόως αὐτῷ πληρώματι πᾶσαν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν διὰ τῆς προγνωστικῆς ἐνεργείας κατανοήσας. *Ibid.*, 22, *loc. cit.*, 204D: Γέγονεν οὖν κατ' εἰκόνα ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἡ καθόλου φύσις, τὸ θεοείκελον χρῆμα. Γέγονε δὲ τῇ παντοδυνάμῳ σοφίᾳ οὐχὶ μέρος τοῦ ὅλου, ἀλλ' ἅπαν ἀθρόως τὸ τῆς φύσεως πλήρωμα Origen had anticipated to some extent this Gregorian view of the "first creation" of man as that of the "fullness" of mankind. See, for instance, *In Jeremiam homil.* II, 1, GCS, Orig. III, 17. . . . ἡ ψυχὴ οὐ τοῦ πρώτου μόνου γέγονε «κατ' εἰκόνα» ἀλλὰ πάντος ἀνθρώπου, cf. Crouzel, *Théologie de l'image de Dieu chez Origène*, 149 f. For the Platonist elements in Gregory's notion of the *pleroma* of mankind cf. S. Gonzalez, S.J., "El realismo platónico de S. Gregoria de Nisa," *Gregorianum* XX (1939), 189 ff. K. Holl, *Amphilochius von Ikonium in seinem Verhältnis zu den grossen Kappadoziern dargestellt* (Tübingen, Leipzig, 1904), 222 f., and J. B. Schoemann, "Gregors von Nyssa theologische Anthropologie als Bildtheologie," *Scholastik* XVIII (1943), 39 f., rightly emphasize that this Platonism is modified to fit Gregory's Christian redemptional system of thought; still, it is somewhat surprising that Gregory does not in this connection refer to the Pauline doctrine of the Church as the Body of Christ, a *pleroma*, as it were, of mankind *sub specie Christianitatis*, for, according to Ephesians 4:13, we shall "all meet . . . unto a perfect man," εἰς μέτρον ἡλικίας τοῦ πληρώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ. Elsewhere Gregory does expound beautifully this Pauline doctrine; cf., for instance, *In Cantica canticorum, homil.* VIII and XIII, PG XLIV, 149B and 1048A ff. — See also A. H. Armstrong, "Platonic Elements in St. Gregory of Nyssa's Doctrine of Man," *Dominican Studies*, I (1948), 115.

¹⁰⁸ See, for instance, *De mortuis*, PG XLVI, 528A: Μάταιον τοίνυν δέδεικται . . . τὸ δυσμενὲς πρὸς τὴν τῆς σαρκὸς ἔχειν φύσιν. Οὐ γὰρ ταύτης ἥρτηται τῶν κακῶν ἡ αἰτία.

siders it as the great occasion of evil for the mind. The empirical body is certainly less spiritual than the rational soul. Through its close connection with the lower, the vegetative, and the animalic parts of the soul it is apt to drag the spirit down to an ever lower material level.¹⁰⁹ Of this anti-spiritual tendency in the body, its bisexuality is the principal symptom and symbol though not the full content. Often Gregory simply identifies the sexual organization of man and his corporeal condition, or, more exactly, the constitution of the body after Paradise and before the resurrection. The event related in the last sentence of Genesis 1:27 “male and female he created them,” is most closely related in Gregory’s mind with the making of man’s body in that instant of simultaneous creation when everything was created virtually. Contrary to Philo, he bases his concept of a double creation almost exclusively on Genesis 1:26 and Genesis 1:27; not on Genesis 2:7. This is a very interesting divergence to which it will be necessary to return.

The construction of his double creation doctrine around Genesis 1:26 and Genesis 1:27 is a prerequisite for Gregory’s rather original solution of his principal anthropological problem; these two verses form the hub around which, for him, the body-mind relationship turns. They define the Archimedian point from which he tries to move the great dilemma between man’s spiritual image-likeness to God and his involvement in the irrational tangles of this world.

It is best again to turn to his own words:

“Thus the making of our nature is in a sense twofold: one made similar to the divine, the other divided according to that difference [between the sexes]. . . .”¹¹⁰

“How was it that after the making of His image God contrived for His creature the difference according to male and female? . . . He who brought all things into being and formed man as a whole by His own will to the divine image, did not have to wait to see the number of souls perfected to its proper fulness by the gradual additions of those coming after. . . .” (This, of course, still refers to the virtual simultaneous creation of the *pleroma* of all mankind according to the image of God).¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Cf. *De hom. op.* 18, *loc. cit.*, 193C, and 22, *loc. cit.*, 208A.

¹¹⁰ *De hom. op.* 16, *loc. cit.*, 181B: Οὐκοῦν διπλὴ τίς ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν κατασκευή, ἣ τε πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὁμοιωμένη, ἣ τε πρὸς τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην διηρημένη.

¹¹¹ *De hom. op.* 17, *loc. cit.*, 189B f.: . . . πῶς μετὰ τὴν κατασκευὴν τῆς εἰκόνος τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ διαφορὰν ὁ Θεὸς ἐπιτεχνᾷται τῷ πλάσματι Ὁ γὰρ τὰ πάντα παραγαγὼν εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ ὅλον ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ θελήματι τὸν ἄνθρωπον πρὸς τὴν θείαν εἰκόνα διαμορφώσας οὐ ταῖς κατ’

But, Gregory continues, "[God] foresaw by His all-seeing power that [man's] free will would not go straight forward toward the beautiful and good, and thus would fall off from the angelic life. In order, therefore, that the full number of human souls might not be curtailed by the fall from that mode by which the angels were increased to full number — for this reason, He prepared in our nature the device of increase suitable to those who have slipped down into sin."¹¹²

God then created man as a composite being, not only spiritual, but also sexual-corporeal, because He foresaw his fall, his original sin, which was Adam's and Eve's disobedience, and all the dire consequences which culminate in fallen man's mortality. As did most of the Fathers, so also Gregory of Nyssa assumed that the sexual condition of man is most representative of his brute corporeality, that it constitutes the most powerful of his passions and the main difference between man and God. Yet, his principal reason for laying such emphasis on man's bisexuality was, as pointed out, other than this. The source of evil is not in God: it is rather man's withdrawal from the God-given good and therefore something purely negative.¹¹³ But God knows that man, through the perverse use of his free will, of his spiritual liberty, would lose his God-like, his quasi-angelic, his immortal life. Was he to lose it forever? One might resume Gregory's answer to this question thus: Only if man received mutability, which is essentially linked to his bodily constitution, and the gift of sexual propagation, would mankind as a whole, be able to reach its pre-ordained *pleroma*, only thus would it have the opportunity to return to God. Without the mutable and mortal body man would have remained fixed in spiritual aversion from God, together with the fallen angels;¹¹⁴ without sexual propagation mortal fallen

ὀλίγον προσθήκαις τῶν ἐπιγινομένων ἀνέμεινεν ἰδεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἴδιον πλήρωμα τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ψυχῶν τελειούμενον . . .

¹¹² *De hom. op.* 17, *loc. cit.*, 189C f.: . . . ἐπειδὴ προείδε τῇ ὁρατικῇ δυνάμει μὴ εὐθυπορούσαν πρὸς τὸ καλὸν τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῆς ἀγγελικῆς ξωῆς ἀποπίπτουσαν, ὥς ἂν μὴ κολοβωθείη τὸ τῶν ψυχῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πλῆθος ἐκπεσὼν ἐκείνου τοῦ τρόπου καθ' ὃν οἱ ἄγγελοι πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος ἠϋξήθησαν, διὰ τοῦτο τὴν κατάλληλον τοῖς εἰς ἁμαρτίαν κατολισθήσασιν τῆς αὐξήσεως ἐπίνοιαν ἐγκατασκευάζει τῇ φύσει . . .

¹¹³ *Oratio catechetica* 5, ed. Srawley, *loc. cit.*, 28: . . . οὐχ ὁ Θεός σοι τῶν παρόντων ἐστὶν αἴτιος κακῶν, ἀδέσποτόν τε καὶ ἄνετόν σοι κατασκευάσας τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀβουλία τὸ χεῖρον ἀντὶ τοῦ κρείττονος προελομένη.

¹¹⁴ This is more explicitly stated by Nemesius of Emesa, *De natura hominis* 1, PG XL, 521B–524A, where he explains how angels, contrary to men, cannot become penitent. — As Professor B. Otis has kindly pointed out to me in conversation and correspondence, the angelology of Gregory of Nyssa and of the other great Cappadocians presents certain difficulties, yet, to me these difficulties do not seem as fundamental as they seem to Professor Otis; see also *infra* note 152. For Basil and Gregory Nazianzen at any rate, the angels are

man would have become extinct in Adam and Eve.¹¹⁵ Through God's foresight humanity obtained the opportunity of reform in its individuals. At the end of time, in heaven, where, as Gregory reminds us, there is no marriage,¹¹⁶ the first creational image-likeness with God, with Christ, in whom there is neither male nor female,¹¹⁷ will come to the fore again in undiluted fashion. Mankind's task in time and history is to become what it is in God's original plan: a spiritual being or, more exactly, a being in which the full dignity of man is vindicated not only in his mind but also in a spiritualized body. Had not St. Paul said: "What is sown a natural body, rises a spiritual body"?¹¹⁸

Gregory's theory of time is closely bound up with this anthropology, in spite of the fact that, contrary to St. Augustine's, his concept of time is basically cosmological rather than psychological. Foresight of corporeal mortality, which is a result of the protoplasts' transgression, necessitated both man's constitution as a bisexual being and the temporal organization of the world.¹¹⁹ For, that fulness (*pleroma*) of a God-like human race which God contemplated at the very beginning and which, in a sinless state, could have been accomplished, along with the *pleroma* of the angels, without death, without sexual propagation,¹²⁰ and without temporal delay, must and will now be achieved by a long detour. Sexual propagation must make up for individual mortality; the passions which, because of the animalic mode of our conception and birth, are common to us and the animals — although worse in us because of the contamination with a perverted spirit,¹²¹ — must be slowly and laboriously purged and rectified;¹²² the fullness of

essentially not ἀκίνητοι, but only δυσμετάθετοι or δυσκίνητοι (cf. Basil, *De Sancto Spiritu* 16, 38, PG XXXII, 137, and Gregory Nazianzen, *Oratio* XXIX, 31, PG XXXVI, 72A–D, and *Oratio* XXXVIII, 11, *ibid.*, 321A, after Professor Otis), which in my opinion sufficiently explains the possibility of the fall of Lucifer. It appears to me very probable that for Gregory of Nyssa, too, it was only after the fall of the bad angels that the good angels were certain to adhere to God forever: in the case of the angels, apparently, only one single decision for or against God could be envisaged. (Whether Gregory of Nyssa thought that the bad angels, too, would finally be redeemed in the apocatastasis of all things seems doubtful; cf. J. Daniélou, S.J., "L'apocatastase chez Saint Grégoire de Nysse," *Recherches de science religieuse* XXX [1940], 328 ff., Gr. Nyss., *Création*, Laplace-Daniélou, 64–68, Völker, *Gregor* 281).

¹¹⁵ See the text quoted *supra* p. 84, note 112.

¹¹⁶ Luke 20:35 f.; cf. Gregory of Nyssa, *De hom. op.* 17, *loc. cit.*, 188C.

¹¹⁷ Galatians 3:28; cf. *De hom. op.* 16, *loc. cit.*, 181A and 181D.

¹¹⁸ I Corinthians 15:44; cf. *De anima et resurrectione*, PG XLVI, 156A.

¹¹⁹ See *De hom. op.* 22, *loc. cit.*, 205B ff.

¹²⁰ Cf. *De hom. op.* 17, *loc. cit.*, 189A.

¹²¹ *De hom. op.* 18, *loc. cit.*, 192D ff.

¹²² *De hom. op.* 18, *loc. cit.*, 193C ff. For Gregory's conception of purification which leads to *apatheia* see J. Daniélou, *Platonisme*, 92 ff., Jaeger, *Rediscovered Works*, 79, Völker, *Gregor*, 259 ff.

mankind, which might have been ever-present in a timeless instant of eternity, must become reality through a long chain of generations whose end only God knows.¹²³ This, according to Gregory of Nyssa, is also why we must wait so long for the resurrection of the bodies and the restoration of all things.¹²⁴ But in man's fallen state this temporal delay is a necessity and a boon not only with regard to the physical completion of the human race, but even more with regard to its spiritual reformation.¹²⁵ The temporal rhythm is one of life and death, of wakefulness and sleep, of tension and relaxation, of continuous renewal until time be consumed and consummated in eternity. What Gregory says about reformation and time, resurrection and eternity, stands on the border line between the philosophical-physiological and the mystical-ascetic aspects of his anthropology.

While these latter aspects fall outside the scope of this paper,¹²⁶ it is necessary before summing up Gregory of Nyssa's philosophical anthropology to add a few clarifications concerning his concept of the body and of its union with soul and mind. Gregory himself must have felt such a necessity when in *De hominis opificio*, after having traced man's spiritual drama from creation to the resurrection of the bodies, he returns once more to the psychosomatic relationship.¹²⁷

The question in fact arises why, if the body as we know it was created by God only in foresight of the fall, the final reformation of man's image-likeness to God should include the resurrection of the body. From a philosophical point of view this question is even more important than the other, discussed by Gregory in *De hominis opificio* and elsewhere: how such resurrection of the bodies is possible; in other words, how a body dissolved into its elements can be reunited with its appertaining soul.¹²⁸

The first question in part coincides with a third one: If, as Gregory often asserts, the reformation of man in this life and beyond is an ἀποκα-

¹²³ *De hom. op.* 22, *loc. cit.*, 205B–209A.

¹²⁴ *De hom. op.* 22, *loc. cit.*, 204B f., and the rest of the chapter.

¹²⁵ Cf. Gaïth, *Conception de la liberté chez Grégoire de Nysse*, 168 ff. See also the text of Nemesius, *De natura hominis* 1, PG XL, 521A–524, about καίρος and μετένοια.

¹²⁶ See *supra* p. 62. Cf. the literature quoted p. 61, note 2.

¹²⁷ *De hom. op.* 28 ff., *loc. cit.*, 229B ff.

¹²⁸ This latter question is discussed by Gregory, for instance, in *De hom. op.* 27, *loc. cit.*, 225C ff., and in *De anima et resurrectione*, PG XLVI, 73B f., where the Platonic-Aristotelian concept of εἶδος is used to demonstrate that even in the complete dissolution of the material body its "idea" or "form" somehow remains attached to the fragments and can be recognized by the soul and reintegrated with it in the resurrection. For this whole trend of thought Gregory no doubt was indebted to Origen who in the same context of the doctrine of the resurrection had spoken of an indestructible εἶδος χαρακτηρίζον τὸ σῶμα, cf. *Selecta in Ps.* I, 5, PG XII, 1093B f. P. Laplace's translation of εἶδος as *aspect extérieur* in Gr.Nyss., *Création*, Laplace-Daniélou 212 f. seems to me misleading.

τάσταις εἰς τὸ ἀρχαῖον,¹²⁹ if the resurrection belongs to the restoration of all things to their primitive integrity, why then should man again become a spiritual-corporeal composite? For, did not God originally create man in His image which is spiritual?

But did Gregory of Nyssa really believe that God would not have given man a body at all, had He not foreseen the protoplast's sin? This is probably the most difficult question of Gregorian anthropology, since Gregory is far from explicit in answering it. While he definitely asserts that God made man bisexual only because of His foreknowledge of man's transgression, Gregory did not look at the creation of the body as such in the same merely conditional and derogatory way. In the *Catechetical Oration* he gives as a reason for the mingling of the intelligible and the sensible in man God's desire that "no part of creation might be rejected [cf. I Timothy 4:4] . . . nor deprived of divine communion" and that "grace, as it were, might evenly extend through all creation. . . ." ¹³⁰ There remains here, nevertheless, a certain lack of clarity or explicitness in the Bishop of Nyssa's doctrine, which, perhaps, explains in part the serious charges against Gregory's consistency raised by H. Cherniss, whose doubt of Gregory's intellectual integrity is less justifiable.¹³¹ Cherniss' arguments, though based on a somewhat too exclusive view of Gregory's Platonism, to the exclusion, that is, of essential Stoic elements, are nevertheless, very penetrating and deserve more attention than they have so far received. I am convinced that a definitive evaluation of Gregory of Nyssa's anthropology requires a more thorough examination of this criticism of his thought. Here I must limit myself to an attempt at a brief elucidation of the point just touched upon: Gregory's teaching on the resurrection of the body, which in H. Cherniss' view amounts to a full antinomy between the Bishop of Nyssa's Platonic spiritualism and his allegedly uneasy acceptance of the Christian dogma. The coherence of Gregory's whole anthropology does indeed hinge on the question whether or not he believed that it could have been meaningful for man, the spiritual image of God, to have a body even without sin. If it can be shown that his opinion in this matter was affirmative, it is not surprising that the eschatological resurrection of the bodies was not a

¹²⁹ See, with regard to the resurrection of the bodies, for instance, *De anima et resurrectione*, PG XLVI, 148: ὅτι ἀνάστασις ἐστὶν ἢ εἰς τὸ ἀρχαῖον τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν ἀποκατάστασις, also *ibid.*, 149D and 156C, and *Oratio catechetica* 8, ed. Srawley, *loc. cit.*, 42; with regard to pre-eschatological reform see, for instance, *De virginitate* 12, ed. Cavarnos, *Greg. Nyss. Opera*, ed. Jaeger, VIII, 1, 302: Εἰ οὖν αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπίνοια τῆς τοῦ ζητουμένου εὐρέσεως ἢ τῆς θείας εἰκόνος εἰς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἀποκατάστασις τῆς νῦν ἐν τῇ τῆς σαρκὸς ῥύτῳ κεκαλυμμένης, ἐκείνο γενώμεθα ὃ ἦν παρὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐαυτοῦ ζωὴν ὁ πρωτόπλαστος.

¹³⁰ *Oratio catechetica* 6, ed. Srawley, *loc. cit.*, 31.

¹³¹ Cherniss, *Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa*, esp. 57 f., 62 ff.

stumbling block to him in the elaboration of his anthropological doctrine. And I believe it can so be shown, though only fragmentary efforts in this direction have so far been made.

It will be remembered how strongly Gregory of Nyssa stressed the unity of body and soul in actual man, that is to say, in Adam and Eve and all their descendents.¹³² His entire conception of the unfolding of simultaneous virtual creation is teleologically geared to the actual simultaneous emergence of the mind or the rational, spiritual part of man's soul, and the lower soul and body. This event no doubt took place at the stage of Genesis 2:7, when God formed Adam from earth and vivified him by His breath, though in *De hominis opificio* Gregory glides very quickly over this first moment of man's actual history,¹³³ and in the *Oratio catechetica* he does not clarify the relationship between the man of Genesis 1:26 f. and the Adam of Genesis 2:7.¹³⁴ However, what he does clearly indicate on many occasions is the moment in which Adam actually, and historically so to speak, assumed that passible and passionate, corporeal-sexual condition which man has had ever since. This moment was not that of Genesis 2:7, but it corresponds to a somewhat later stage of the Genesis-account, when God gave Adam and Eve garments made from the skins of animals. These are the famous *χιτῶνες δερμάτινοι*, the "tunics of skin" of Genesis 3:21¹³⁵ which have a long history in late classical and early Christian thought.¹³⁶ These super-added skins or garments, which Adam and Eve had to put on after the fall, Gregory of Nyssa expressly identifies with man's actual assumption of that coarsely corporeal mode of existence¹³⁷ which God had at first created only poten-

¹³² See *supra* pp. 69 ff.

¹³³ In *De hom. op.* he mentions this moment only in a negative sense, see 22, *loc. cit.*, 204D: when the "man according to the image" was made, Adam, the *γῆρινον πλάσμα*, was not yet being made.

¹³⁴ See *Oratio catechetica* 6, ed. Srawley, *loc. cit.*, 30 ff.

¹³⁵ Genesis 3:21: "And the Lord God made for Adam and his wife garments of skins and clothed them."

¹³⁶ See, for instance, Daniélou, *Platonisme*, 27 ff and 55 ff.; also P. Wendland, "Das Gewand der Eitelkeit," *Hermes* LI (1916), 481 ff., J. Quasten, "A Pythagorean Idea in Jerome," *American Journal of Philology* LXIII (1942), 207 ff., *id.*, "Theodore of Mopsuestia on the Exorcism of the Cilicium," *Harvard Theological Review* XXXV (1942), 209 ff., L. Spitzer, "Additional Note on 'Wool and Linen' in Jerome," *American Journal of Philology* LXIV (1943), 98 f., W. J. Burghardt, S.J., "Cyril of Alexandria on 'Wool and Linen,'" *Traditio* II (1944), 484 ff.

¹³⁷ See *De anima et resurrectione*, PG XLVI, 148C f., where, in discussing the shedding of these tunics of skin in the resurrection, Gregory speaks of their super-added character and infers the original absence of animalic corporeality in the protoplasts: . . . ἡμῶν ἀποδυσσάμενων τὸν νεκρὸν ἐκείνον καὶ εἰδεχθῆναι χιτῶνα τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἀλόγων δερμάτων ἡμῶν ἐπιβληθέντα . . . πάντα ὅσα τοῦ ἀλόγου δέρματος περὶ ἡμᾶς ἦν ἐν τῇ ἀπεκδύσει τοῦ χιτῶνος συναποβαλλόμεθα. Ἔστι δὲ αὖ προσέλαβεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου δέρματος, ἡ μῆξις, ἡ σύλληψις, ὁ τόκος, ὁ ῥύπος, ἡ θηλή, ἡ τροφή, ἡ ἐκποίησης, ἡ κατ' ὀλίγον ἐπὶ τὸ τέλειον αὔξεις, ἡ ἀκμή, τὸ γῆρας, ἡ νόσος, ὁ θάνατος. See also *De*

tially, when according to Genesis 1:27 He made man male and female. Gregory's whole anthropology is directed toward the overcoming of corporeality as it exists in man after the fall. This is why Genesis 1:27, which stresses the origin of sexuality and Genesis 3:21, which in Gregory's interpretation refers to mortality¹³⁸ or to irrationality¹³⁹ and in any case to brute animalic existence, through the metaphor of the skins of dead animals, are for him the crucial scriptural texts concerning the creation of man's body. He has little to say about man's origin from earth, according to Genesis 2:7.¹⁴⁰ He would no doubt have elaborated on it had he considered the earthen shape of Adam a symbol of gross, material corporeality. That he did not do so would seem to confirm that for him Adam's actually emergent body, the body of Genesis 2:7 which was shaped from earth but enlivened by God, was not yet the wretched passionate and passible body that poses such an exasperating problem for Gregory. One is justified, I believe, in surmising that to Gregory of Nyssa the bodily condition as such, as it existed in Adam and Eve in Paradise before the fall, was not affected and afflicted by passions, that it was a corporeality very much like the spiritual one which will again prevail after the resurrection, and that this spiritualized corporeality was in God's plans for man from the beginning, quite apart

mortuis, PG XLVI, 521D–524D. — That the tunics of skin of Genesis 3:21, and not the creational body of Genesis 2:7, correspond to the material corporeality virtually created in the beginning according to Genesis 1:27, but conditional upon the fall, is confirmed by a passage in the *Catechetical Oration*, where Gregory directly identifies God's providential and remedial action in creating the mortal body with His clothing Adam and Eve in the "dead skins" of Genesis 3:21. See *Oratio catechetica* 8, ed. Srawley, *loc. cit.*, 43: 'Επειδὴ γὰρ . . . ἐν τοῖς ἀπηγορευμένοις ἐγένοντο οἱ πρῶτοι ἄνθρωποι καὶ τῆς μακαριότητος ἐκείνης ἀπεγυμνώθησαν, δερματίνους ἐπιβάλλει χιτῶνας τοῖς πρωτοπλάστοις ὁ Κύριος . . . ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ πᾶν δέρμα χωρισθὲν τοῦ ζῶον νεκρὸν ἐστὶ, πάντως οἶμαι τὴν πρὸς τὸ νεκροῦσθαι δύναμιν, ἢ τῆς ἀλόγου φύσεως ἐξαίρετος ἦν, ἐκ προμηθείας μετὰ ταῦτα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπιβεβληκέναι τὸν τὴν κακίαν ἡμῶν ἰατροῦντα οὐχ ὡς εἰς αἰὲ παραμένειν. Ὁ γὰρ χιτῶν τῶν ἔξωθεν ἡμῶν ἐπιβαλλομένων ἐστί, πρὸς καιρὸν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χρῆσιν παρέχων τῷ σώματι, οὐ συμπεφυκὼς τῇ φύσει. In his interpretation of Genesis 3:21 Gregory probably used and modified Philo's allegorical exegesis. Philo, *Questions and Answers on Genesis* I, 53, ed. Marcus, *loc. cit.*, 30 f., interprets the *χιτῶνες δερματίνοι* of Genesis 3:21 allegorically as man's body, whereas the man molded from clay according to Genesis 2:7 is, for Philo, not yet the body, but rather the earthlike mind which mixes with the body, but has not yet actually been mixed with it, cf. *Legum Allegoria* I, 12, 31 f., ed. Cohn, *loc. cit.*, 68 f. (see also p. 81). As Wolfson, *Philo* I, 118 f., has shown, Philo's assumption that the creation of the body proper occurred as late as Genesis 3:21 corresponds to a Jewish tradition which included all events preceding Adam's and Eve's expulsion from Paradise in the six days of creation. Gregory differs from Philo in that for him the *χιτῶνες δερματίνοι* do not mean the body as such, but only its passionate, passible and mortal aspects. In this he may be influenced by Origen; cf. *In Leviticum homil.* VI, 2, GCS, *Orig.* VI, 362, but see also Origen's doubts, *Selecta in Genesim*, to Genesis 3:21, PG XII, 101B.

¹³⁸ Cf. *Oratio catechetica* 8, *loc. cit.*

¹³⁹ Cf. the texts from *De anima et resurrectione* and from *De mortuis* quoted in note 137.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. *supra*, pp. 83 and 88.

from his foreknowledge of Adam's and Eve's sin.¹⁴¹ In fact, the Bishop of Nyssa himself gives at least some hints that such was his belief.

Gregory speaks of *χιτῶνες* or *ἐνδύματα φωτοειδεῖς* or *λαμπρά*, of tunics or garments that man wore before he had to put on the tunics of skin, and that he will regain through Christ.¹⁴² These luminous and aerial garments — they, too, incidentally, are an older concept of the history of religious thought¹⁴³ — correspond to the paradisiac condition of man. A Christian receives them back in baptism; he can make them his lasting possession even on earth in his mystic-ascetic ascent to God, and they will be an eternal reward of the saints in the resurrection of their bodies.¹⁴⁴ It would really seem that for Gregory the body was originally spirit-like as it will again be in the end.¹⁴⁵ True, the creational body was bisexual, while the resurrectional body will be neither male nor female;¹⁴⁶ but, in Paradise, sexuality was not yet operative;¹⁴⁷ the creation of the sexes according to Genesis 1:27

¹⁴¹ Holl, *Amphilochius von Ikonium* 202 ff., also stresses the fact that Gregory saw in Genesis 3:21 an allegorical expression of a real transformation of man's corporeal existence in the sense of a change from a more spiritual to a more material body. In this connection cf. E. F. Sutcliffe, S.J., "St. Gregory of Nyssa and Paradise," *The Ecclesiastical Review* LXXXIV (1931), 338. For Gregory the spiritual restoration of man by Christ, including the spiritualization of the body in the resurrection, is a return to his spiritual state in Paradise. Since this restoration is at the same time a reformation of man's original image-likeness with God, one is led again to a realization of the unified character of man's creation: for God the virtual creation of the *pleroma* of mankind in the spiritual image of God (see *supra*, p. 82) and of the spirit-like uncorrupted and passionless body of the first individual man are one. It is therefore not advisable to distinguish sharply, with Schoemann, "Gregors von Nyssa theologische Anthropologie . . .," *Scholastik* XVIII, 34 ff. and 42 ff., between the "original supra-historical image of God" (i.e., the *pleroma* of mankind) and the "original historical image of God" (i.e., man's state in Paradise); Schoemann himself admits that a strict distinction is impossible. It is essential to recognize that in Gregory's view, while spirit remains supreme, the body — but not sex — was not an "afterthought" of God.

¹⁴² See, for instance, *De oratione dominica* 5, PG XLIV, 1184B: the descendants of Adam wear the "tunics of skin," τῶν ἰδίων τε καὶ λαμπρῶν ἐνδύματων γυμνωθέντες Also *In Cantica canticorum*, homil. XI, PG XLIX, 1005B: . . . τοὺς ἅπασι τῷ θεῷ κοσμηθέντας ἐνδύματι μηκέτι ἐπενδύσασθαι τὸν τῆς ἁμαρτίας χιτῶνα. . . . Τίς γὰρ κοινωνία τῷ σκοτεινῷ ἐνδύματι πρὸς τὸν φωτοειδῆ τε καὶ αὔλον; For these terms and concepts see also Daniélou, *Platonisme* 57.

¹⁴³ See, for instance, G. P. Wetter, *Phōs* (Skrifter . . . K. Humanistiska Vetenskaps-Samfundet i Uppsala XVII, 1 [Uppsala, Leipzig, 1915]), 172 ff., and A.-J. Festugière, O.P., *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* III (Paris, 1953), 144 ff.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Daniélou, *Platonisme* 27 ff. and 57 f.

¹⁴⁵ *De anima et resurrectione*, PG XLVI, 108A: Ὅψει γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ σωματικὸν περιβόλαιον τὸν νῦν διαλυθὲν τῷ θανάτῳ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πάλιν ἐξυφαινόμενον, οὐ κατὰ τὴν παχυμερῆ ταύτην καὶ βαρεῖαν κατασκευήν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ λεπτότερόν τε καὶ ἀερῶδες μετακλωσθέντος τοῦ νήματος, ὥστε σοι καὶ παρῆναι τὸ ἀγαπόμενον καὶ ἐν ἀμείνονι καὶ ἔρασμωτέρῳ κάλλει πάλιν ἀποκαθίστασθαι. The original spirit-likeness of the body is suggested also in *De hom. op.* 8, loc. cit., 145C, where Gregory speaks of τὸ λεπτὸν καὶ φωτοειδὲς τῆς αἰσθητικῆς φύσεως.

¹⁴⁶ See, for instance, *In Cantica canticorum*, homil. VII, PG XLIV, 916B.

¹⁴⁷ *De hom. op.* 17, loc. cit., 188A: ἀποικισθέντων δὲ τοῦ παραδείσου μετὰ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν καὶ τῆς γυναικὸς τῇ τιμωρίᾳ τῶν ὠδίνων κατακριθείσης οὕτως ἐλθεῖν τὸν Ἀδὰμ εἰς τὸ γνῶναι γαμικῶς τὴν ὁμόζυγον καὶ τότε τῆς παιδοποιίας τὴν ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι. — F. Floeri, "Le sens de la «division des

involved only the possibility, not the necessity of sexual propagation. For, in Paradise before the fall, man was similar to the angels. Gregory says explicitly that man's mode of propagation, too, could have been an angelic one.¹⁴⁸ If then man's creational body was close to spirit, the Gregorian doctrine of the resurrection of the bodies is not inconsistent with his anthropological system, not even with his Christian version of Platonism.¹⁴⁹

Thus Gregory of Nyssa, after all, saves the dignity of the body as well as that of the mind, though it is only a fully spiritualized body which seems to him worthy of man. This conception of a victory of mind over matter is Christian, but it is also in the tradition of Greek *paideia*. In the mystical anthropology of his *Life of Moses* and of other exegetical and ascetical treatises Gregory describes in combined Christian and pre-Christian terms¹⁵⁰ the road to that spiritualization which in some degree can be attained even in this life.

sexes» chez Grégoire de Nysse,” *Revue des sciences religieuses* XXVII (1953), 108, rightly points to the fact that only after the fall of Adam and Eve and after their being clothed in the “tunics of skin” does Gregory use such terms as marriage (γάμος) and sexual union (μίξις); regarding the time before the fall he speaks only of the distinction of male and female (e.g. *De hom. op.* 16, *loc. cit.*, 185A: ἡ περὶ τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ διαφορά).

¹⁴⁸ *De hom. op.* 17, *loc. cit.*, 188D f.: Εἰ τοίνυν ἡ τῶν ἀποκαθισταμένων ζωὴ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀγγέλων οἰκείως ἔχει, δηλονότι ὁ πρὸ τῆς παραβάσεως βίος ἀγγελικὸς τις ἦν· διὸ καὶ ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχαῖον τῆς ζωῆς ἡμῶν ἐπάνοδος τοῖς ἀγγέλοις ὁμοίωται. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, καθὼς εἴρηται, γάμου παρ’ αὐτοῖς οὐκ ὄντος ἐν μυριάσιν ἀπείροις αἱ στρατιαὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων εἰσὶν . . . Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, εἴπερ μηδεμίαν παρατροπὴν τε καὶ ἔκστασιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγγελικῆς ὁμοιότητος ἐξ ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἂν οὐδὲ ἡμεῖς τοῦ γάμου πρὸς τὸν πληθυσμὸν ἐδεήθημεν. Cf. St. Augustine’s implicit criticism of this view in *De civitate Dei* XIV, 26, *Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina* XLVIII, 449 ff., and St. Thomas Aquinas’ explicit rejection of Gregory’s exposition of it, as expressed in *De hominis opificio*, in the *Summa Theologica* I, 98, 2.

¹⁴⁹ Cherniss, *Platonism*, 57 f., holds that Gregory in conceiving of the resurrection of the body as a restoration of man’s original state, and of the resurrectional body itself as lacking the body’s πάθη contradicts himself; also, that Gregory accepts the doctrine of the resurrection only because he is forced to do so. Cherniss’ argument would be valid, if for Gregory the restoration of man necessarily means in an Origenist sense return to purely incorporeal intelligibility; actually it means the “recreation” of the spiritualized body of Adam in Paradise. In *De anima et resurrectione*, PG XLVI, 137B–145A, Gregory deals at considerable length with objections similar to those of Professor Cherniss: it would indeed seem that in the resurrection man must either lose his identity, if his body is no longer an ordinary body, or, if his body were to be the same as in this present life, the resurrection would be disastrous and, at the same time, monstrous, since it would have to recall to simultaneous existence all the various ages and stages of an ever-changing material entity. Gregory overcomes these difficulties with the help of St. Paul’s doctrine of death and resurrection according to I Corinthians 15:42 ff.: just as a grain “is sown in corruption,” molds and dies in the ground to rise as a new ear, “in the same fashion human nature, while in death it drops all properties surrounding it, which it had acquired through its passionate disposition . . . , yet does not lose itself . . .”; for the risen spiritual body, though it is something nobler than the terrestrial body of post-paradisiac man, is still “nothing else than what it was at first,” i.e., in Paradise (cf. *De anima et resurrectione*, *loc. cit.*, esp. 156A–C).

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Jaeger, *Rediscovered Works*, 76 ff.

On the philosophical level Gregory of Nyssa's ultimate answer to the great anthropological problem of the body's relation to the God-like mind on the one hand and to passion and death on the other seems to be the following: Even though bisexuality of the body was given to man in foresight of sin and death, the body of Paradise was still very close to spirit. It was and is man's sin, his turning away from true beauty and goodness, that made and makes the body not only actively sexual but also a source of evil.

In a striking passage of *De hominis opificio* Gregory says:

"While . . . [our material part and our mind-ruled nature] cling to one another, the communion of the true beauty extends proportionally through all, making beautiful through the superior that which is next to it. But when there occurs any gap in this good connection or when even, on the contrary, the superior in turn follows the inferior, then . . . the shapelessness of matter comes through. . . . Thus the transmission through [our] nature of material ugliness arrives at the mind itself, so that the image of God is no longer seen in the character of the creature. . . . And in this way there comes about the genesis of evil . . . and thus it is shown that our material part remains firm and subject when it is governed by [our] nature [which is held together by our mind], but on the other hand it is dissolved and falls asunder when it is severed from that which holds it together and in subjection and when it is torn away from its connection with the beautiful and good. But this happens only when [our] nature turns to [its] opposite, when our desire inclines not to the beautiful, but to that which is in need of being made beautiful. For it is absolutely necessary that that which becomes similar to matter, which is in want of a form of its own, be transformed also into something formless and unbeautiful. . . ." ¹⁵¹

¹⁵¹ *De hom. op.* 12, *loc. cit.*, 161D–164B (this text is the continuation of the one quoted on p. 77, note 75): "Ἐως ἂν οὖν ἔχεται τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ ἕτερον, διὰ πάντων ἀναλόγως ἢ τοῦ ὄντως κάλλους κοινωνία διέξεισι διὰ τοῦ ὑπερκειμένου τὸ προσεχὲς καλλωπίζουσα. Ἐπειδὴν δέ τις γένηται τῆς ἀγαθῆς ταύτης συμφυΐας διασπασμὸς ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἔμπαλιν ἀνακολουθῇ τῷ ὑποβεβηκότι τὸ ὑπερέχον, τότε . . . διενέχθη τὸ ἄσχημον . . . Καὶ οὕτως ἐπ' αὐτὸν τὸν νοῦν τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην αἰσχούς διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἢ διάδοσις γίνεται, ὡς μηκέτι τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν εἰκόνα ἐν τῷ χαρακτήρι καθορᾶσθαι τοῦ πλάσματος . . . Καὶ τοῦτω γίνεται τῷ τρόπῳ τοῦ κακοῦ ἢ γένεσις . . . Δείκνυται διὰ τούτων ὅτι τὸ ὕλικόν ἡμῶν συνέστηκε μὲν καὶ περικρατεῖται ὅταν οἰκονομῇται ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως· λύεται δὲ καὶ διαπίπτει πάλιν ὅταν χωρισθῇ τοῦ περικρατοῦντός τε καὶ συνέχοντος καὶ διασπασθῇ τῆς πρὸς τὸ καλὸν συμφυΐας. Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἄλλως γίνεται ἢ ὅταν τῆς φύσεως πρὸς τὸ ἔμπαλιν γένηται ἢ ἐπιστροφὴ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας νενούσης, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ χρεῖζον τοῦ καλλωπίζοντος. Ἀνάγκη γὰρ πάσα τῇ πτωχεύουσῃ τῆς ἰδίας μορφῆς ὕλη κατὰ τὸ ἄσχημόν τε καὶ ἀκαλλῆς συμμεταμορφοῦσθαι τὸ ὁμοιούμενον . . ."

This text is Christian and Greek in its identification of true beauty with goodness and in its definition of human nature as a harmony of body and mind. It is not difficult to integrate it with Gregory's interpretation of man's double creation according to the book of Genesis.

Once more: God according to Genesis 1:27 gave man a mortal and bisexual body because He foresaw how he would act and because He knew that under these circumstances mortality and sexuality would have a remedial function; but neither Adam nor any man had or has to do evil. Only when Adam and Eve actually committed sin did the inferiority of man's bodily constitution make its appearance, symbolized in Holy Scripture by the *χιτῶνες δερμάτινοι* of Genesis 3:21. As far as its relation to evil is concerned, the body was and is only an instrument, and it can be an instrument also of good. In Paradise, before the fall, the body was in full unison with the highest part of the soul, and, after its resurrection, it will again be in harmony with the spirit. On earth the ascetic way of life mystically anticipates man's return to Paradise and must, therefore, tend toward spiritualization of the body and thus toward re-assimilation to God.

It was not my intention in this paper to smooth out all the difficulties of Gregory of Nyssa's anthropological thought.¹⁵² It is quite certain that he himself did not believe that he had said the last word on a Christian anthropology. On the contrary, he often humbly advances theories as hypotheses, even his pivotal doctrine of the double creation of man.¹⁵³ There is, nevertheless, an imposing unity about Gregory of Nyssa's thought on man and on the dignity of human nature. Spirit, soul, and body are one in man. His image-likeness to God was true resemblance from the very beginning: *eikon* and *homoiosis* were one even in creation, just as they will be one again in spiritual reformation and in corporeal resurrection. The creational body itself does not disturb Gregory's vision of God's plans for man and the universe, for that body was indeed a light burden — luminous, spirit-like. Even now it is beautiful and marvelously adapted to the mind: it has remained a work of God who obviously did not consider bodies valueless if He created them.

¹⁵² Some of the difficulties in the thought of Gregory of Nyssa and of the other Cappadocians, particularly in their conception of sin, are dealt with by Professor Otis in this volume. It seems to me, however, that Professor Otis somewhat overstresses the element of ignorance in the Cappadocians' concept of sin; I cannot quite share his view that this conception accounted for their difficulty in explaining the sin of spiritual creatures, especially of the angels. The Cappadocians' apparent perplexity before the fact that angels and "spiritual" men should choose evil knowingly, seems to me to derive, rather, from a genuine realization of the "mystery of iniquity."

¹⁵³ Cf., for instance, *De hom. op.* 16, *loc. cit.*, 180C: 'Ημεῖς δὲ, καθ' ὅσον χωροῦμεν, στοχασμοῖς τισι καὶ ὑπονοίαις τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀνιχνεύοντες ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ζητουμένων ὑπολαμβάνομεν.

Yet, there remains in Gregory of Nyssa's thinking, I would not say, a contradiction, but a tension which, it seems to me, is also a part of his greatness. It is, in short, the tension between the Gregorian, the Cappadocian, and, generally, the Platonizing form of Greek Christian spirituality and the ineluctable materiality of the physical world which includes non-human nature. This beautiful world, of which God was the creator and man was to be the master, cannot be fully real and at the same time fully spiritualized after Paradise and before the general resurrection and the restoration of all things. Perhaps this Greek and Christian tension between matter and spirit is resolved symbolically in the sacred art of Byzantium, where figures of angels and of saints, almost disembodied in Basilian contempt of all *πολυσαρκία*, weightlessly glide past the jewel-like beauty of a not-quite-real nature.